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Deductive reasoning is a fundamental cognitive skill, and consequently has been the 
focus of much research over the past several decades. In the realm of syllogistic reasoning—
judging the validity of a conclusion given two premises—a robust finding is the belief bias 
effect: broadly, the tendency for reasoners to judge as valid more believable than unbelievable 
conclusions. How the content believability of conclusions influences syllogistic reasoning has 
been the subject of hundreds of experiments and has informed several theories of deductive 
reasoning; however, how the content of premises influences the reasoning processes has been 
largely overlooked. In this thesis, I present 5 experiments that examine how premise content 
influences reasoning about categorical (i.e., statements with the words ‗some‘ and ‗not‘) and 
conditional (i.e., ‗if/then‘ statements) syllogisms, which tend to be treated as interchangeable in 
deductive reasoning literature.  It is demonstrated that premise content influences reasoning in 
these two types of syllogisms in fundamentally different ways. Specifically, Experiment 1 
replicates and extends previous findings and demonstrates that for conditional syllogisms, belief 
bias results when premises are both believable and unbelievable; however, reasoners are more 
likely to judge that a conclusion is valid when it follows from believable than from unbelievable 
premises.  Conversely, belief bias for categorical syllogisms results only when premises are 
believable; conclusion believability does not influence conclusion endorsement when premises 
are unbelievable.  
Based on these preliminary findings, I propose a theory that categorical and conditional 
syllogisms differ in the extent to which reasoners initially assume the premises to be true, and 
that this difference influences when in the reasoning process reasoners evaluate the believability 
of premises. Specifically, I propose that reasoners automatically assume that conditional, but not 
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categorical, premises are true. It is proposed that, because the word ―if‖ in conditional statements 
elicits hypothetical thinking, conditional premises are assumed to be true for the duration of the 
reasoning process. Subsequent to reasoning, premises can be ―disbelieved‖ in a time-consuming 
process, and initial judgments about the conclusion may be altered, with a bias to respond that 
conclusions following from believable premises are valid. On the other hand, because categorical 
premises are phrased as factual propositions, reasoners initially judge the believability of 
categorical premises prior to reasoning about the conclusion. Unbelievable premises trigger the 
reasoner to disregard content from the rest of the syllogism, perhaps because the reasoner 
believes that the information in the problem will not be helpful in solving the problem.  
This theory is tested and supported by four additional experiments. Experiment 2 
demonstrates that reasoners take longer to reason about conditional syllogisms with unbelievable 
than believable premises, consistent with the theory that unbelievable premises are ―disbelieved‖ 
in a time-consuming process. Further, participants demonstrate belief bias for categorical 
syllogisms with unbelievable premises when they are instructed to assume that premises are true 
(Experiment 3) or when the word ‗if‘ precedes the categorical premises (Experiment 4). Finally, 
Experiment 5 uses eye-tracking to demonstrate that premise believability influences post-
conclusion premise looking durations for conditional syllogisms and pre-conclusion premise 
looking durations for categorical syllogisms. This finding supports the hypothesis that reasoners 
evaluate the believability of conditional premises after reasoning about the conclusion but that 
they evaluate the believability of categorical premises before reasoning about the conclusion. 
Further, Experiment 5 reveals that participants have poorer memory for the content of categorical 
syllogisms with unbelievable than believable premises, but memory did not differ for conditional 
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syllogisms with believable and unbelievable premises. This suggests that unbelievable premise 
content in categorical syllogism is suppressed or ignored.  
These results and the theory of premise evaluation that I propose are discussed in the 






 I would like to thank, first and foremost, Jonathan Fugelsang, my supervisor and friend. 
His endless academic and personal support was greatly appreciated throughout the ups and 
downs of the past five years.  
 
 Second, thank you to committee members Derek Koehler and Colin MacLeod for their 
helpful suggestions on this thesis, and to members of the Reasoning and Decision Making Lab, 
for their academic support and friendship. 
 
 Finally, thank you to the many family members and friends who helped to make the past 









Table of Contents 
 
  List of Figures .................................................................................................. p. ix 
 
I. Introduction ..................................................................................................... p. 1 
II.  Experiment 1 .................................................................................................... p. 18 
Method ................................................................................................. p. 19 
Results .................................................................................................. p. 21 
Discussion ............................................................................................ p. 25 
III.  Experiment 2 .................................................................................................... p. 33 
Method ................................................................................................. p. 34 
Results .................................................................................................. p. 36 
Discussion ............................................................................................ p. 45 
IV.  Experiment 3 .................................................................................................... p. 49 
Method ................................................................................................. p. 50 
Results .................................................................................................. p. 51 
Discussion ............................................................................................ p. 62 
V.  Experiment 4 .................................................................................................... p. 65 
Method ................................................................................................. p. 66 
Results .................................................................................................. p. 67 
Discussion ............................................................................................ p. 79 
VI.  Experiment 5 .................................................................................................... p. 81 
Method ................................................................................................ p. 84 
Results ................................................................................................. p. 86 
Discussion ............................................................................................ p. 99 
 
viii 
VII.  General Discussion ........................................................................................ p. 102 
References ..................................................................................................... p. 115 
Appendix A ................................................................................................... p. 122 
Appendix B ................................................................................................... p. 126 






















List of Figures 
Figure 1.  Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of  
Conclusion Validity and Believability for Conditional Syllogisms  
with Believable Premises and Unbelievable Premises.......................................p. 23 
Figure 2.  Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of  
Conclusion Validity and Believability for Categorical Syllogisms  
with Believable Premises and Unbelievable Premises.......................................p. 24  
Figure 3.  The theorized reasoning process for Conditional Syllogisms...........................p. 31 
Figure 4.  The theorized reasoning process for Categorical Syllogisms............................p. 32 
Figure 5.  Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of  
Conclusion Validity and Believability for Conditional Syllogisms  
with Believable and Unbelievable Premises......................................................p. 37  
Figure 6.  Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of  
Conclusion Validity and Believability for Categorical Syllogisms  
with Believable and Unbelievable Premises......................................................p. 38 
Figure 7.  Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and  
Believability for Conditional Syllogisms with Believable and  
Unbelievable Premises.......................................................................................p. 42 
Figure 8.  Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and 
  Believability for Categorical Syllogisms with Believable and  






Figure 9.  Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of  
Conclusion Validity and Believability for Conditional Syllogisms  
with Believable and Unbelievable Premises for the Control Group.................p. 52 
Figure 10.  Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of 
  Conclusion Validity and Believability for Categorical Syllogisms  
with Believable and Unbelievable Premises for the Control Group..................p. 53 
Figure 11.  Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of  
Conclusion Validity and Believability for Conditional Syllogisms with  
Believable and Unbelievable Premises for the Experimental Group.................p. 54 
Figure 12.  Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of 
  Conclusion Validity and Believability for Categorical Syllogisms with  
Believable and Unbelievable Premises for the Experimental Group.................p. 55 
Figure 13.  Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and 
  Believability for Conditional Syllogisms with Believable and  
Unbelievable Premises for the Control Group...................................................p. 58  
Figure 14.  Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and  
Believability for Categorical Syllogisms with Believable and  
Unbelievable Premises for the Control Group...................................................p. 59 
Figure 15.  Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and  
Believability for Conditional Syllogisms with Believable and  





Figure 16.  Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and  
Believability for Categorical Syllogisms with Believable and  
Unbelievable Premises for the Experimental Group.........................................p. 61  
Figure 17.  Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of  
Conclusion Validity and Believability for Conditional Syllogisms  
with Believable and Unbelievable Premises for the Control Group..................p. 68   
Figure 18.  Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of  
Conclusion Validity and Believability for Categorical Syllogisms  
with Believable and Unbelievable Premises for the Control Group..................p. 69 
Figure 19.  Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of  
Conclusion Validity and Believability for Conditional Syllogisms with 
  Believable and Unbelievable Premises for the Experimental Group.................p. 70 
Figure 20.  Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of  
Conclusion Validity and Believability for Categorical Syllogisms with  
Believable and Unbelievable Premises for the Experimental Group.................p. 71 
Figure 21.  Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and  
Believability for Conditional Syllogisms with Believable and  
Unbelievable Premises for the Control Group...................................................p. 74 
Figure 22.  Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and  
Believability for Categorical Syllogisms with Believable and  





Figure 23.  Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and  
Believability for Conditional Syllogisms with Believable and  
Unbelievable Premises for the Experimental Group.........................................p. 76 
Figure 24.  Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and  
Believability for Categorical Syllogisms with Believable and  
Unbelievable Premises for the Experimental Group.........................................p. 77 
Figure 25.  Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of  
Conclusion Validity and Believability for Conditional Syllogisms  
with Believable and Unbelievable Premises......................................................p. 88  
Figure 26.  Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of  
Conclusion Validity and Believability for Categorical Syllogisms  
with Believable and Unbelievable Premises......................................................p. 89 
Figure 27.  Total looking time to Premises and Conclusion a function of  
Premise Believability for Conditional and Categorical Syllogisms...................p. 91 
Figure 28.  Total looking time to Premises pre- and post-conclusion fixation  
as a function of Premise Believability for Conditional and Categorical  
Syllogisms..........................................................................................................p. 93 
Figure 29.  Frequency of transitions from conclusion to premises as a  
function of Conclusion Validity and Believability for Conditional  




Figure 30.  Frequency of transitions from conclusion to premises as a  
function of Conclusion Validity and Believability for Categorical  
Syllogisms with Believable and Unbelievable Premises.................................p. 96 
Figure 31.  Average number of words recalled from Conditional and  

















Deductive reasoning is a fundamental cognitive ability that has been considered to be one 
of the cornerstones of logical thought since the time of Aristotle. According to Piaget, 
demonstrations of deductive reasoning signalled the development of logical thinking abilities and 
the attainment of formal operations, the final stage of cognitive development (Inhelder & Piaget, 
1958). Certainly, the ability to reason deductively is necessary in our daily lives to accurately 
derive conclusions from sets of information. For example, if a doctor prescribes you medication 
and tells you not to take aspirin on days that you take the medication, it is important to accurately 
reason that if you take the medication today, you cannot take aspirin today. Now, imagine the 
case that you have a headache, for which you typically take aspirin, on a day that you need to 
take your newly prescribed medication. To avoid dangerous drug interactions, it is imperative to 
be able to ignore your belief that aspirin is acceptable to take when you have a headache. This 
essential component of reasoning – reasoning only with relevant information and disregarding 
beliefs – often proves difficult.  
In the laboratory, deductive reasoning is typically studied by presenting participants with 
syllogisms with two premises and a conclusion. Participants are instructed to determine whether 
the conclusion necessarily follows from the information contained in the premises, or whether 
the conclusion is valid or invalid given the premises. Syllogisms may be categorical or 
conditional in nature. Categorical syllogisms contain two premises and a conclusion that 
represent relations among different classes of entities. In abstract terms, a typical categorical 
syllogism can be represented as below: 
 
  No A are B 
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  Some C are B 
  Therefore, some C are not A (Valid) 
   or 
  Therefore, some A are not C (Invalid) 
 
Syllogisms may also contain conditional premises and conclusions, which depict 
hypothetical relations in ―If/Then‖ statements. Conditional syllogisms always have a major 
premise that is conditional in nature, and a minor premise which may or may not be another 
conditional. An abstract conditional syllogism with two conditional premises (also known as a 
hypothetical syllogism, sorite, or syllogism with double conditionals) is represented below: 
  
  If A, then B 
  If B, then C 
  Therefore, If A, then C (Valid) 
   or 
  Therefore, If C, then A (Invalid) 
 
Most studies of reasoning use syllogisms that are categorical in nature or they use 
problems with a major conditional premise and a minor categorical premise (e.g., If p, then q; p; 
therefore, q). Conditional problems of this nature lend themselves to distinct theories of 
reasoning which will not be further addressed here. For the purposes of this dissertation, 
conditional reasoning will refer to syllogisms with two conditional premises, unless otherwise 
noted, so that direct comparisons may be made between categorical and conditional syllogisms. 
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The Belief Bias Effect 
For both categorical and conditional syllogisms, accurate deductive reasoning requires 
that people evaluate the conclusion using only logical relations contained in the premises. 
However, the tendency for people to take into account their prior knowledge and beliefs results 
in a common fallacy known as belief bias (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983). This extremely 
robust phenomenon indicates that reasoners are more likely to endorse a conclusion as valid 
when it is also believable, or consistent with their knowledge about the world. Typically, the 
effects of conclusion believability are stronger on invalid than on valid conclusions.  
The belief bias effect is one of the most widely replicated findings in the deductive 
reasoning literature, and points strongly to the influence of conclusion content on the ability to 
reason logically. The effect is found for both categorical (Evans et al., 1983; Klauer, Munch, & 
Naumer, 2000) and conditional syllogisms (Santamaria, Gargia-Madruga, & Johnson-Laird, 
1998; Torrens, Thompson, & Cramer, 1999; Thompson, 1996; Evans & Over, 2004). Most 
modern explanations of belief bias can account for the effect in both categorical and conditional 
syllogisms and therefore do not necessarily distinguish between mechanisms underlying the two 
types of syllogisms. A brief review of two major theories of belief bias demonstrates this. 
Theories of Belief Bias 
First, the mental-models account of deductive reasoning, pioneered by Johnson-Laird 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984), proposes that reasoners begin by 
constructing models of information contained in the premises. Mental models can be thought of 
as iconic, diagram-like spatial representations of premises (Johnson-Laird, 2001; Knauff, 
Mulack, Kassubek, Salih, & Greenlee, 2002). According to the Mental Models account, 
deductive reasoning occurs in three stages (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991): First, reasoners use 
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their general knowledge to construct a model of the information that the premises describe; 
second, reasoners attempt to use this model to arrive at a conclusion about the information in the 
premises; and third, reasoners attempt to search for alternative models that falsify this 
conclusion. The number of models possible given a set of premises varies, and a conclusion is 
valid if it is consistent with all possible models.  
The Mental Models account of syllogistic reasoning has been applied to categorical 
(Oakhill, Johnson-Laird, & Garnham, 1989) and conditional (Santamaria et al., 1998; Torrens et 
al., 1999) syllogistic reasoning. To illustrate, take the example of the following categorical 
premises: 
 
No cigarettes are inexpensive 
Some addictive things are inexpensive 
  
According to the Mental Models theory, reasoners first construct a model of the premises using 
symbolic tokens. In standard Mental Models notation (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), each 
horizontal line represents a single model of the premises. Square brackets indicate that all 
members of the set are represented exhaustively, that is, no members of the set may occur 
elsewhere in the model; ellipses after a model indicate that more models may be added to the set 
in addition to the initial models (i.e., the set has not been entirely “fleshed out”). In these 
additional fleshed out models, ¬ symbolizes the negation of a token. The first premise, No 






    [inexpensive] 
    [inexpensive] 
  . . . 
   
The above model indicates that cigarettes and inexpensive things exist as tokens that are 
mutually exclusive. The second premise, Some addictive things are inexpensive, would be 
represented as below: 
  
addictive things  inexpensive 
 addictive things  inexpensive  
  . . . 
  
In the second step of the reasoning process, reasoners must combine these models to 
arrive at an integrated model of both premises, and then derive a conclusion. The integrated 




    [inexpensive]   addictive things 




This integrated models yields the valid conclusion, Some addictive things are not 
cigarettes. This model also yields the conclusion, No cigarettes are addictive things. If the 
models are fully fleshed out, the reasoner will arrive at the following integrated model: 
 
 [cigarettes] 
 [cigarettes]     addictive things 
    [inexpensive]   addictive things 
    [inexpensive]  addictive things 
  
This fleshed out model falsifies the conclusion that no cigarettes are addictive things. 
 Now, take the following conditional syllogism: 
 
   If an animal is a bird, then it has a beak 
   If an animal has a beak, then it has feathers 
 
Again, reasoners would begin by forming models of the premises. The first premise yields the 
following fleshed out model (Johnson-Laird, 2008, personal communication): 
 
 [bird]   [beak] 
[bird]   [beak] 
[¬bird]  [beak] 
[¬bird]  [¬beak] 




The second premise yields the following model: 
 
 [beak]   [feathers] 
 [beak]   [feathers] 
 [¬beak]  [feathers] 
 [¬beak]  [¬feathers] 
  . . . 
The integrated model becomes: 
 
 [bird]  [beak]  [feathers] 
[¬bird] [beak]  [feathers] 
[¬bird] [¬beak] [feathers] 
[¬bird] [¬beak] [¬feathers] 
 
The model of the premises yields only one valid conclusion: If an animal is a bird, then it has 
feathers. Note that it is not necessary to flesh out the model to refute this conclusion; this is a 
one-model syllogism.  
 Errors in deduction arise when reasoners fail to account for all models of the premises 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Specifically, for belief bias, the believability of the conclusion 
affects the model generation step of the reasoning process. First, reasoners construct an initial 
model of the premises, rejecting conclusions that are invalid given this model. Second, reasoners 
consider the believability of the conclusion: If the conclusion is believable, then reasoners are 
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more likely to prematurely halt the search for models that falsify the conclusion and are more 
likely to accept the conclusion as valid. However, if the conclusion is unbelievable, reasoners are 
more motivated to search through all possible models, which explains why effects of conclusion 
validity are greater when conclusions are unbelievable (Newstead, Pollard, Evans, Allen, 1992; 
Oakhill et al., 1989). The Mental Models theory of reasoning has been called upon to explain 
belief bias resulting from both categorical syllogistic reasoning (Oakhill et al., 1989) and 
conditional syllogistic reasoning (Santamaria et al., 1998; Torrens et al., 1999).  
 A second influential class of reasoning theories (though not necessarily exclusive from 
mental model accounts, Evans, 2003; Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009), is known as Dual Process 
accounts of reasoning (see Evans, 2003, 2008 for reviews). Several variations of Dual Process 
accounts have been proposed (e.g., Evans, 1989; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 1999), although all of 
them share similar features. In general, Dual Process theorists posit that there are two systems 
that may be engaged during reasoning (the names of these two systems vary across theories; the 
terminology of Stanovich, 1999, is used here): System 1 is thought to be unconscious, automatic, 
fast, and to provide a response based on heuristics or associative processes; System 2 is thought 
to be conscious, deliberative, slow, and to provide a response based on logical analysis of the 
problem. System 2 is also thought to suppress and override System 1 in cases where System 1 
provides a faulty response (Stanovich, 1999). In the case of belief bias, System 1 is thought to 
provide a response based on the believability of the conclusion (i.e., ―valid‖ if the conclusion is 
believable). This response will be correct in cases where the validity and the believability of the 
conclusion are congruent. However, where the validity and believability of the conclusion 
conflict (e.g., a valid, yet unbelievable conclusion), if System 2 is engaged, there is a higher 
likelihood of arriving at the correct answer based on logical analysis of the syllogism. 
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 Dual Process theories differ in how they account for the time course of the reasoning 
process, falling into two categories. First, Default Interventionist Models (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002, 2005; Evans, 2006) posit that System 1 provides an automatic, default response 
based on the believability of the conclusion, and that System 2 may subsequently override the 
response provided by System 1 and provide a response based on logic if there is sufficient time, 
cognitive resources, and motivation. On the other hand, Parallel Process Models (Sloman, 1996, 
2002) propose that System 1 and System 2 are always activated in parallel and that both systems 
provide a response. Because the two systems are activated in parallel, reasoners are often aware 
when there is a conflict between the validity and believability of the conclusion. Parallel Process 
Models have garnered some support from response latency analyses, which show that reasoners 
typically spend longer on problems in which the validity and believability of the conclusion 
conflict (Stupple & Ball, 2008, De Neys, 2007).  
Reasoning with False Premises 
 It is clear that the content of the conclusion can greatly affect the outcome of deductive 
reasoning: Several experiments have replicated the belief bias phenomenon and much effort has 
been expended explaining this phenomenon. It is curious, then, that relatively little attention has 
been paid to how the content of the premises within a syllogism affect reasoning. Indeed, two 
thirds of a syllogism is comprised of information in premises, and the influential theory of 
Mental Models itself postulates that one begins the reasoning process by modelling the premises. 
In most studies of conditional and categorical syllogistic reasoning, participants are instructed to 
assume that premises are true for the purposes of the experiment. However, there are several 
instances in daily life where we must reason about information that is contrary to our beliefs. For 
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example, scientists must often reason about data that are contrary to their theoretical beliefs, and 
consumers should be able to reason about unlikely product claims.   
 Relatively few experiments have examined how people reason about believable versus 
unbelievable information in premises. This gap in the literature is not without reason: Syllogisms 
do not readily lend themselves to varying the believability of premises and conclusions. As an 
illustration, it is logically impossible to create a valid syllogism with two believable premises 
and an unbelievable conclusion. Nevertheless, there are experiments which have successfully 
isolated some effects of premise believability on deductive reasoning. 
In the realm of conditional reasoning with a major conditional premise and minor 
categorical premise, George (1995, 1997, 1999) has presented evidence that when major 
conditional premises are made uncertain by the introduction of qualifying terms such as 
―probably,‖ reasoners are less likely to accept valid conclusions, as they likely transfer this 
uncertainty to the conclusion. Further, Markovits and colleagues (Markovits, Saelen, & Forgues, 
2009; Markovits & Schroyens, 2007) have shown that under instructions to assume that premises 
are true, participants accept unbelievable conclusions more readily when the major premise is 
false than when it is true or plausible. These researchers suggest that when the premise is false, 
reasoners inhibit information about the items contained in the premises, making it more palatable 
to accept an unbelievable conclusion. Moreover, the Mental Models account addresses the 
influence of premise believability on conditional reasoning (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). 
According to the principle of semantic modulation, ―the meanings of the antecedent and 
consequent, and coreferential links between these two clauses, can add information to models, 
prevent the construction of otherwise feasible models of the core meaning, and aid the process of 
constructing fully explicit models‖ (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p. 13). Essentially, the 
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meaning of the premises is proposed to facilitate or to block the formation of models. For 
example, the proposition, if it is a game, then it is not soccer, theoretically yields the following 
models: 
 
  Game   ¬Soccer 
  ¬Game  ¬Soccer 
  ¬Game  Soccer 
  
However, rational individuals would agree that it is not possible for soccer not to be a game. This 
knowledge would block the formation of the third model of the premises. Thus, models that are 
believable are more readily formed than models that are false.  
The experiments discussed above used problems with a major conditional premise and a 
minor categorical premise. Thompson (1996) examined deductive reasoning for conditional 
syllogisms with two conditional premises, analogous to standard categorical syllogisms (e.g., ―If 
an animal is a bird, then it has a beak; If an animal has a beak, then it flies‖). She provided 
participants with two or three sets of premises and corresponding valid and invalid conclusions. 
Premise believability varied between participants: For each participant, all premises were either 
believable or unbelievable. For each set of premises, participants were asked to select, from a list 
of four possible conclusions, all those that were valid given the premises. Her results indicated 
that when premises were believable, participants tended to endorse more conclusions as valid 
than when premises were neutral or unbelievable. Belief bias resulted regardless of premise 
believability: For both believable and unbelievable premises, participants were more likely to 
endorse believable conclusions as valid. Unfortunately, Thompson was not able to examine all 
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combinations of believability of premises and conclusions, but her data clearly show that 
believable premises caused participants to endorse more conclusions relative to unbelievable 
premises. Further, because belief bias resulted for both believable and unbelievable premises, 
Thompson concluded that premises are considered separately from conclusions, stating, ―given 
the absence of an interaction between validity and belief, [...] premise believability acts 
independently of any logical analysis that is performed‖ (p. 318). 
This effect has not been successfully replicated, however. Torrens, Thompson, and 
Cramer (1999) presented participants with similar syllogisms with two conditional premises. 
Although they report that participants endorsed more believable than unbelievable conclusions 
(i.e., the belief bias effect), they did not find that participants endorsed more conclusions 
following from believable than from unbelievable premises. This failure to replicate Thompson‘s 
(1996) finding may be due to differences in methodologies: In Thompson‘s original experiment, 
premise believability was manipulated between subjects, whereas Torrens, Thompson, and 
Cramer manipulated premise believability within subjects. That this effect has not been 
successfully replicated warrants further study. 
 Studies of premise believability in categorical syllogistic reasoning are extremely 
lacking; in fact, I am aware of only one experiment that systematically varied premise 
believability to determine its effects on reasoning processes for categorical syllogisms. 
Cherubini, Garnham, Oakhill, and Morley (1998; Experiments 3 and 4) presented participants 
with nine pairs of categorical premises in which either one or both were false, and asked 
participants to generate conclusions following from the premises. Interestingly, they found that 
when both premises were false, belief bias was not evident; that is, participants were not more 
likely to generate believable than unbelievable conclusions. The authors proposed a modified 
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Mental Models account, in which information about the terms in the premises is brought to mind 
before the premises are modeled. If this information is consistent with one‘s previous 
knowledge, then one is likely to use this information when deriving a conclusion; however, if it 
is inconsistent, it will not be used. Again, this research suffers because of the logical structure of 
syllogisms: The investigators were not able to examine how participants respond to syllogisms 
with believable premises and unbelievable, valid conclusions. 
Conditional versus Categorical Syllogistic Reasoning 
 This review of past research on premise believability brings to light an interesting 
discrepancy between categorical syllogisms and conditional syllogisms with double conditional 
premises. In her study of conditional syllogisms, Thompson (1996) found that premise 
believability did not influence the belief bias effect; rather, believable premises simply increased 
the number of ―valid‖ responses given by participants. On the other hand, Cherubini et al. (1998) 
found that when premises were unbelievable, the belief bias effect was completely eliminated. It 
is compelling that differential effects of premise believability were found for these two types of 
syllogisms, given that existing theories of deductive reasoning would not predict differences. 
Indeed, the two types of syllogisms have identical task demands (i.e., deducing whether a 
conclusion is valid given two premises) and both elicit the belief bias effect, so without taking 
differential effects of premise believability into account, there is no reason to assume that 
reasoners treat these syllogisms differently. It seems, then, that varying premise believability 
could be a fruitful tool for examining potential differences in how reasoners treat conditional and 
categorical syllogisms.   
 This question is a crucial one, given that conditional and categorical syllogisms have 
been used in the literature to inform the same theories of deductive reasoning and belief bias. 
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The majority of experiments examining deductive reasoning use categorical syllogisms: Such 
experiments have been used to support or to falsify various reasoning theories (e.g., Newstead et 
al., 1993; Klauer, Munch, & Naumer, 2000). However, experiments using conditional syllogisms 
have also played an influential role in deductive reasoning theories. For example, as discussed 
above, following Thompson‘s (1996) experiment using conditional syllogisms, she concluded 
that premises are considered independently of the conclusion during deductive reasoning, and 
suggested that current theories of reasoning need to account for this fact. Santamaria and 
colleagues (Santamaria et al., 1998) report that, just as with categorical syllogisms, participants 
drew a valid conclusion from double conditional premises more often when the conclusion was 
believable than when it was unbelievable, and they drew believable valid conclusions quicker 
than unbelievable conclusions. They interpret these findings in terms of the same Mental Models 
theory that accounts for results of experiments using categorical syllogisms. 
On this same point, Torrens and colleagues (Torrens et al., 1999) used conditional 
syllogisms in a large study examining individual differences in the belief bias effect, including 
how skilled participants were at considering different models of premises. They found that 
intelligence and general deductive reasoning ability was not related to the extent to which 
participants were influenced by conclusion believability, however, performance on the model 
generation task strongly predicted belief bias. They concluded that, ―the results provide clear 
support for the Mental Models Theory [...] assumption that the search for alternative models is 
implicated as an integral part of the belief bias effect‖ (p.22). Clearly, it is important to question 
whether these findings contribute to theories of deductive reasoning in general, or theories of 
reasoning about specific syllogisms. If reasoning about categorical and conditional reasoning 
differ along important dimensions, such as how the belief bias effect is influenced by premise 
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content, then it becomes imperative for theories of deductive reasoning to be tailored to—or at 
least to accommodate—different forms of reasoning.  
Indeed, other researchers have just recently begun to question whether categorical and 
conditional syllogisms share similar underlying mechanisms. Reverberi et al. (2010) employed 
fMRI technology to demonstrate that this may not be the case. They presented participants with 
72 categorical syllogisms and 60 conditional syllogisms with two conditional premises (note that 
they did not control for premise believability) and identified brain regions active during premise 
integration, which they defined as the point at which the second premise was read. Their results 
showed that for both conditional and categorical syllogisms, there was activation in the left 
prefrontal cortex and left basal ganglia. There was additional activation during the integration of 
categorical premises in the occipital medial gyrus, lateral parietal lobe, and precuneus. These 
results provide some initial evidence that conditional and categorical syllogistic reasoning may 
not be governed by the same cognitive mechanisms and, at the very least, that considering 
categorical premises involves some extra processing over considering conditional premises.  
Further, in a study of categorical syllogistic reasoning, Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005) 
demonstrated that under time pressure, reasoners made more responses that were consistent with 
the believability of the conclusion. This finding was taken as evidence that syllogistic reasoning 
is consistent with Default Interventionist theories of reasoning, because reducing the time that 
one has to reason through a problem reduces the probability that System 2 will have enough time 
to override the default answer provided by System 1. However, Evans, Handley, and Bacon 
(2009) applied a similar methodology to conditional problems (these problems had one major 
conditional premise and one minor categorical premise), and did not find that time pressure 
influenced belief bias. They concluded that ―these findings confirm our suggestion that belief 
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effect in conditional inference may operate quite differently from the belief bias observed in 
syllogistic reasoning‖ (p. 82).  
Rationale for this Dissertation 
 Evidence is recently coming to light that categorical and conditional syllogistic reasoning 
may rely on different reasoning mechanisms. Although the two types of syllogisms elicit 
seemingly indistinguishable belief bias effects, it may be the case that varying the content of 
premises, a manipulation which has largely been overlooked, provides a tool to elucidate 
differences underlying reasoning about these two types of syllogisms. Previous research 
examining effects of premise believability on reasoning has produced inconsistent findings and is 
fraught with methodological difficulties, including those imposed by the logical structure of 
syllogisms.  
This dissertation addresses these issues, beginning with successful replication of the 
discrepant findings of previous researchers (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, response latencies 
provide evidence that reasoners are less likely to take the believability of the conclusion into 
account for categorical syllogisms with unbelievable than with believable premises, and are 
slower to reason about conditional syllogisms with unbelievable than with believable premises. 
Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate that conditional and categorical premises differ in the extent to 
which reasoners assume the premises to be true; specifically, instructions to assume that 
premises are true (Experiment 3) and the word “if” (Experiment 4) both appear to trigger 
hypothetical thinking. Finally, Experiment 5 uses the somewhat novel approaches of eye-
tracking to support the proposed time course of reasoning. It is argued that reasoners initially 
assume that conditional premises are true, and then reject them after the conclusion has been 
reasoned about, whereas reasoners evaluate the believability of categorical syllogisms prior to 
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reasoning about the conclusion. Further, Experiment 5 explores memory for the content of 
syllogisms, and supports the position that reasoners disregard content of categorical syllogisms 
with unbelievable premises. Overall, I will use premise believability as a tool to extract 
differences underlying categorical and conditional syllogistic reasoning, and in doing so, will 















 As noted in the introduction, there is some evidence that varying premise believability 
results in differential reasoning outcomes for categorical and conditional syllogisms (Thompson, 
1996; Cherubini et al., 1998). However, these two investigations may not be directly 
comparable: They used different methodologies (Thompson used a between-subjects conclusion 
selection task, whereas Cherubini et al. used a within-subjects generation task) and of course 
came from different laboratories. This preliminary experiment was designed to replicate the 
results from previous experiments using a typical conclusion validation procedure with a within-
subjects design so that conditional and categorical reasoning could be directly compared. 
 This experiment also attempted to address the major shortcomings of previous 
experiments imposed by the logical structure of syllogisms. Previous experiments were unable to 
fully examine effects of premise believability because it is not possible to create syllogisms with 
certain combinations of premises and conclusions. Experiment 1 attempted to overcome this 
limitation so that a fully orthogonal examination of premise believability, conclusion validity, 
and conclusion believability could be carried out. For most premises and conclusions, statements 
were used that were true or false by definition. However, for the categorical and conditional 
syllogisms where this was not possible, some exceptions were made. For categorical syllogisms 
with believable premises and valid conclusions, conclusions could not be false by definition. 
However, conclusions could be used that are unsound, or not fully believable. These statements 
have opposite forms which are true. For example, the converse of the conclusion “Some dogs are 
not cats” is “All dogs are not cats,” or “No dogs are cats,” and is true by definition. Also, for 
conditional syllogisms, some premises were necessitated which were not always true or false, but 
were true or false in most cases. For example, although the premise “If a vehicle has wheels, then 
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it has a steering wheel,” is true in most but not all circumstances, it was nonetheless used as a 
believable premise.  
 Thus, Experiment 1 was designed to fully investigate how varying premise believability 
differentially affects reasoning for categorical and conditional syllogisms. It was hypothesised 
that, given the results of Thompson (1996), for conditional syllogisms, varying premise 
believability would not influence the belief bias effect. It was predicted, however, that 
participants would endorse as valid more conclusions following from believable than from 
unbelievable premises. Following the results of Cherubini et al., (1998), it was predicted that for 
categorical syllogisms, the belief bias effect would be found when premises were believable, but 
not unbelievable.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 69 undergraduate students (30 male, 39 female, mean age = 19.84 yrs, 
SD = 1.60 yrs) enrolled in psychology courses at the University of Waterloo who participated in 
exchange for course credit. Participants reported never having taken a course in formal logic. 
Materials 
Syllogisms were constructed that varied orthogonally across four dimensions (see 
Appendix A for a complete list of syllogisms used). First, syllogisms were either categorical or 
conditional in nature; second, premises were either believable or unbelievable; third, conclusions 
were either believable or unbelievable; and fourth, conclusions were either valid or invalid. 
Thirty-two syllogisms were constructed, with two syllogisms in each cell. Conditional 




If A, then B;  
If B, then C;  
Therefore, if A, then C (Valid)  
or  
Therefore, If C, then A (Invalid).  
 
Categorical syllogisms took the form,  
 
No A are B;  
Some C are B;  
Therefore some C are not A (Valid) 
 or  
Therefore, Some A are not C (Invalid) 
 
Pilot testing for the stimuli was conducted with an independent group of 40 
undergraduate students, who rated the believability of premises and conclusions (see pilot data in 
Appendix A). In general, statements that were rated highly believable or unbelievable were used 
to construct the syllogisms. For most problems, statements that were true or false by definition 
comprised the syllogisms, with a few necessary exceptions.  First, using typical true or false 
statements, it is not possible to create valid syllogisms (either categorical or conditional) with 
believable premises and an unbelievable conclusion. Second, it is not possible to create invalid, 
categorical syllogisms with unbelievable premises and an unbelievable conclusion. As such, to 
maintain the orthogonal design of the experiment, some small liberties were taken with these 
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problems. Specifically, either premises were used that were believable, but not necessarily true in 
all cases (e.g., ―If a vehicle has wheels, then it has a steering wheel‖), or conclusions were 
considered unbelievable if their converse was true (cf. Cherubini et al., 1998). For example, the 
converse of the statement used as an unbelievable conclusion, ―Some reptiles are not rats‖ is true 
(i.e., ―No reptiles are rats‖ or ―all reptiles are not rats‖). 
Procedure 
 Each participant reasoned through all 32 syllogisms, which were presented to participants 
in paper booklets with four problems per page. Stimuli were presented in one of eight random 
orders. Participants first read the following instructions:  
This is an experiment to test people‘s reasoning ability. This booklet contains 32 
problems. Each contains two statements followed by a conclusion. You are asked to 
determine if the conclusions may be logically deduced from the statements. If you judge 
that the conclusion necessarily follows from the statements (i.e., that it is a valid 
conclusion based on the information given in the two statements), you should answer by 
circling VALID, otherwise INVALID. Please take your time and ensure that you have the 
right answer. Solve the problems in order, without flipping forward or backward in the 
booklet.‖  
 
Participants were tested in small groups of two to eight individuals.  They were given as much 
time as they needed to complete the task. 
 
Results 
 The proportion of times that participants indicated conclusions were valid are depicted in 
Figure 1 for Conditional Syllogisms with Believable and Unbelievable Premises, and in Figure 2 
for Categorical Syllogisms with Believable and Unbelievable Premises. Endorsement rates (i.e., 
number of times participants indicated that a conclusion was valid) were submitted to a 2 
(Syllogism Type: Conditional, Categorical) x 2 (Premise Believability: Believable, 
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Unbelievable) x 2 (Conclusion Validity: Valid, Invalid) x 2 (Conclusion Believability: 
Believable, Unbelievable) repeated measures ANOVA.  
Results will be discussed, first, in terms of the overall belief bias effect collapsed across 
all problems. Second, the three-way interaction between Syllogism Type, Premise Believability, 
and Conclusion Believability will be examined to determine whether effects of Conclusion 
Believability vary as a function of Syllogism Type and Premise Believability. Third, the 
Syllogism Type x Premise Believability interaction will be examined to determine whether 
participants endorsed more conclusions following from Believable than from Unbelievable 
Premises for Conditional Syllogisms compared to Categorical Syllogisms. Other results that are 
not directly relevant to the theory addressed here are presented in non-bold font in Appendix C 
for this and all following experiments.  
Overall Belief Bias Effect. Collapsed across all problems, the typical belief bias effect 
was found: There were main effects of Conclusion Believability, F(1,68) = 48.44, MSE = .515, p 
< .001, η
2 
= .416, such that participants endorsed more believable than unbelievable conclusions, 
and Conclusion Validity, F(1,68) = 92.03, MSE = .862, p < .001, η
2 
= .575, such that participants 
endorsed more valid than invalid conclusions.. Further, there was an interaction found between 
Conclusion Validity and Believability, such that effects of Conclusion Believability were larger 
for invalid than for valid conclusions, F(1,68) = 10.71, MSE = .368, p <.01, η
2 
= .136. 
Effects of Conclusion Believability as a Function of Syllogism Type and Premise 
Believability. There was a marginally significant three-way interaction between Syllogism Type, 
Premise Believability, and Conclusion Believability, F(1,68) = 3.84, MSE = .341, p = .054, η
2 
= 
.053. To examine the locus of this interaction, conclusion endorsement rates for Categorical and 




Conditional Syllogisms with Believable Premises 
 
 
Conditional Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises 
 
Figure 1. Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 
Believability for Conditional Syllogisms with Believable Premises and Unbelievable Premises. 






































































Categorical Syllogisms with Believable Premises 
 
 
Categorical Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises 
 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 






































































Unbelievable) x 2 (Conclusion Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) repeated measures 
ANOVAs. Importantly, for Categorical Syllogisms, Premise Believability interacted with 
Conclusion Believability, F(1,68) = 8.26, MSE = .387, p <.01, η
2 
= .108. Paired samples t-tests 
revealed that when premises were believable, participants were more likely to endorse believable 
conclusions, t(68) = 4.57, p <.001, which is not surprising, given the robustness of the belief bias 
effect. When premises were unbelievable, however, Conclusion Believability played no role in 
how frequently participants endorsed the conclusion, t(68) = 0.73, p =.465. In contrast to that 
found for Categorical Syllogisms, there was no significant interaction between Premise 
Believability and Conclusion Believability for Conditional Syllogisms, F(1,68) = 0.12, MSE = 
.250, p = .734, η
2 
= .002. 
Conclusion Endorsement for Categorical and Conditional Syllogisms as a Function of 
Premise Believability. The Syllogism Type x Premise Believability interaction was not 
significant, F(1,68) = 2.13, MSE = .435, p = .149, η
2 
= .030. Here, participants did not endorse 
more conclusions following believable than unbelievable premises for either Categorical 
Syllogisms, F(1,68) = 1.38, MSE = .526, p = .245, η
2 
= .020, or Conditional Syllogisms, F(1,68) 




 This experiment was designed to replicate and extend the results of Thompson (1996) 
and of Cherubini et al. (1998), who found different consequences of varying premise 
believability for conditional and categorical syllogisms. In general, their results were replicated 
using a completely matched and orthogonal design. For categorical syllogisms, belief bias was 
found only when premises were believable; that is, both conclusion validity and believability 
affected conclusion endorsement, and there was a greater effect of conclusion believability on 
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invalid conclusions. When premises were unbelievable, only conclusion validity affected 
conclusion endorsement – there was no belief bias effect. Further, there was no main effect of 
premise believability; participants endorsed the same overall number of conclusions following 
from believable premises as from unbelievable premises. These results, using a different task 
(i.e., validation rather than generation), replicated the results of Cherubini et al. (1998); namely, 
when premises of categorical syllogisms are unbelievable, no belief bias effect is found. That this 
effect was replicated using a different task and different stimuli points to its generalizability and 
robustness.  
 Thompson (1996) found that for conditional syllogisms, belief bias occurred for both 
believable and unbelievable premises; however, participants endorsed a greater number of 
conclusions following from believable than from unbelievable conclusions. The results of the 
current experiment partially replicate Thompson‘s results, in that belief bias was found 
regardless of premise believability for conditional syllogisms; that is, participants endorsed more 
valid than invalid conclusions, more believable than unbelievable conclusions, and the effects of 
conclusion believability were greater on invalid than on valid conclusions. Although the data 
show a small trend in the direction of participants endorsing more conclusions that were 
preceded by believable than by unbelievable premises, this difference was not significant. It is 
not clear whether Thompson‘s finding is replicable, or whether the effect was not replicated here 
due to the difference in methodology between this experiment and Thompson‘s. Specifically, the 
current experiment varied premise believability within subjects, whereas Thompson varied 
premise believability between subjects. Given that others using a within-subjects design (Torrens 
et al., 1999) failed to find effects of premise believability with conditional syllogisms, it may be 
that these effects are only evident when participants see either believable or unbelievable 
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premises. Further, the current experiment used a conclusion validation paradigm, whereas 
Thompson used a conclusion selection task. For now, however, it is interesting that varying 
premise believability interacted with conclusion believability for categorical syllogisms but not 
for conditional syllogisms.  
 This experiment also used a novel approach of taking some small creative liberties with 
stimuli so that premise believability, syllogism type, conclusion validity and conclusion 
believability could be examined in a completely orthogonal design. The syllogisms in question, 
specifically categorical and conditional syllogisms with believable premises and valid, 
unbelievable conclusions demonstrated what would be predicted from the belief bias effect: 
Participants endorsed more believable than unbelievable conclusions, even when the 
unbelievable conclusions were not false by definition. Thus, the stimuli seem to have been 
successful at simulating strictly believable and unbelievable statements and can be used in 
paradigms to address effects of premise believability on deductive reasoning.  
 Along with the results of Thompson (1996) and Cherubini et al., (1998), this experiment 
provides significant evidence that premise believability differentially affects how people reason 
through conditional and categorical syllogisms. This in turn suggests that premises are 
considered differently for categorical and conditional syllogisms. How then might premises be 
conceptualized? The reasoning literature itself does not provide much evidence to answer this 
question. The Mental Models account (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), which purports that the 
first step in reasoning is a model of premises, claims that the content of the premises can affect 
how premises are modelled. For example, reasoners will not model as readily what is contrary to 
their knowledge about the world (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009), and the semantic content of 
premises can modulate how models are constructed (with unbelievable models being sacrificed 
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for what is believable; Quelhas, Johnson-Laird, & Juhos, 2010). However, even the Mental 
Models account places greatest importance on the believability of the conclusion, claiming that 
the believability of the conclusion affects how reasoners conceptualize the premises, rather than 
the other way around.  
 It is evident that information contained in premises influences reasoning, but to determine 
how, we may have to consult literatures other than the reasoning literature. Philosophers have 
long debated how everyday information is conceptualized. Rene Descartes (1644/1984) claimed 
that we take in information without initially judging whether it is true or false; our belief 
assessment can be suspended until we rationally analyze the veracity of the information. In 
contrast, Baruch Spinoza (1677/1982) disagreed, claiming that information must be accepted as 
true for it to be comprehended. This acceptance happens automatically, and the information can 
be discredited or ―disbelieved‖ in a process that takes time and cognitive effort. Some modern 
theorists agree with Spinoza‘s claim. Johnson-Laird (1988) articulately asserted that to 
comprehend information, one must ―imagine how the world should be, granted its truth‖ (p.110).  
 A particularly strong proponent of Spinoza‘s philosophy on automatic belief is Gilbert 
(1991). Along with colleagues, he published several experiments showing that when people are 
provided with information, they are likely to believe the information, even when they are told the 
information is false, when their processing of the information was interrupted by concurrent 
cognitive load (Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993), or when processing time was cut short 
(Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990). Other researchers have found that people are able to evaluate 
true statements faster than false statements (Just & Carpenter, 1976). These results suggest that 
the default is to believe information, even when it is signalled to be false, and that disbelieving 
the information may only happen given sufficient time and resources. Note, however, that the 
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findings are not entirely consistent: Hasson, Simmons, and Todorov (2005) found that even 
under cognitive load, participants remembered false statements when they provided useful 
information. Thus, the context and content of statements may modulate how they are 
conceptualized in terms of their veracity.  
 Thus, there is evidence that, at least in some contexts, people initially automatically 
accept statements to be true and then spend time at a later point disbelieving or discrediting 
them. Applying this theory to the results obtained in Experiment 1, it may be possible to explain 
differential effects of premise believability for categorical and conditional syllogisms. Take first, 
conditional premises, the theorized time course of which is depicted in Figure 3. Regardless of 
premise believability, participants reason about conclusions in a similar fashion, as evidenced by 
belief bias resulting for both believable and unbelievable premises. It may be the case that 
reasoners automatically assume that believable and unbelievable conditional premises are true 
for the purposes of reasoning about the conclusion. Subsequently, reasoners may discredit 
unbelievable premises, which then leads them to reject conclusions following from unbelievable 
premises.  This would explain Thompson‘s (1996) finding that participants endorsed more 
conclusions following from believable than from unbelievable premises. 
Consider now categorical syllogisms, for which the theorized reasoning process is 
outlined in Figure 4. In Experiment 1, there was no evidence that participants took into account 
conclusion believability when premises were unbelievable; that is, premise believability seems to 
have determined the course of the reasoning process. Perhaps, contrary to reasoning about 
conditional syllogisms, reasoners do not accept categorical premises to be true, but rather 
initially evaluate their believability prior to reasoning about the conclusion. Then, when 
premises are believable, believability information from the rest of the problem is taken into 
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account, and when premises are unbelievable, believability information in the conclusion is 
disregarded. 
 In summary, I have outlined a preliminary theory of premise conceptualization. This 
theory states that reasoners assume that conditional premises are true prior to reasoning, and then 
discredit them after or somewhere outside of reasoning about the conclusion (i,e., in an 
independent process). In sharp contrast, categorical premises are evaluated prior to reasoning 
about the conclusion, and premise believability determines the course of the reasoning process. 

























Figure 3. The theorized reasoning process for Conditional Syllogisms. It is hypothesized that 
reasoners evaluate the believability of the premises after reasoning about the conclusion, and 






























Figure 4. The theorized reasoning process for Categorical Syllogisms. It is hypothesized that 













The goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate Experiment 1and extend the findings through 
the measurement of response latencies. Although using response latencies as evidence for 
underlying reasoning mechanisms has been successfully used by some researchers (e.g., 
Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, Gunter, & Cambell, 2003; Ball, Phillips, Wade, & Quayle, 2006), 
examining them remains an underused tool, given that most theories of deductive reasoning and 
belief bias make specific predictions regarding response latencies. The current experiment will 
use response latencies to evaluate predictions made by the proposed theory of premise evaluation 
in categorical and conditional reasoning.  
Previous experiments examining response latencies in syllogistic reasoning have shown 
somewhat inconsistent results. Ball et al. (2006) report that participants spent longer on 
categorical syllogisms in which the validity and believability of the conclusion conflicted than on 
syllogisms in which the validity and believability of the conclusion were congruent. Conversely, 
Thompson et al. (2003) did not find this interaction. Rather, these researchers found that, for 
categorical syllogisms, participants took longer to respond to believable than unbelievable 
conclusions, and invalid than valid conclusions. Although these results are in opposition, they 
nonetheless reveal effects of conclusion believability on response latency. 
A secondary goal of Experiment 2 was to address the possibility that differential belief 
bias effects are the result of different numbers of models possible rather than the type of 
syllogism. In Experiment 1, the categorical syllogisms used were multiple-model syllogisms, 
whereas the conditional syllogisms used were single-model syllogisms. As such, it is feasible 
that, given the ease with which single-model syllogisms are conceptualized, reasoners are not 
influenced by premise believability and demonstrate similar belief bias effects regardless of 
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whether the premises are believable or unbelievable. Conversely, given the complexity of 
multiple-model syllogisms, it is possible that reasoners are more likely to be influenced by 
premise believability in a way that influences the belief bias effect. Experiment 2 was designed 
to eliminate this potential confound by varying the number of models possible in the stimuli. 
Given the theory of premise evaluation outlined above, several predictions can be drawn. 
First, if participants initially accept all conditional premises to be true, and then discredit 
unbelievable premises, then participants should take longer reasoning about conditional 
syllogisms with unbelievable than with believable premises. Second, if participants take the 
believability of the conclusion into account when conditional premises are believable or 
unbelievable, there should be different response latencies for believable and unbelievable 
conclusions. Third, if reasoners evaluate categorical premises prior to reasoning, rather than 
assuming premises are true and then rejecting false premises in an additional process, there 
should be no difference in response latencies for believable and unbelievable premises. Finally, 
if reasoners do not take believability information of the conclusion into account when premises 
are unbelievable for categorical syllogisms, then there should be no effect of conclusion 
believability on response latencies. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 40 students (16 male, 24 female, mean age = 20.15 yrs, SD = 2.47 yrs) 
enrolled in psychology courses at the University of Waterloo who participated in exchange for 
course credit. None reported having taken a course in logic. 
Materials  
Thirty-two syllogisms were used that varied across the same dimensions as those used in 
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Experiment 1 but that incorporated an additional dimension: number of models required given 
the premises. To vary difficulty within categorical syllogisms, the number of possible models of 
the premises was varied. Single-model categorical premises took the form ―All A are B; All B 
are C;‖ whereas multi-model premises took the form ―No A are B; Some C are B.‖  Single-
model conditional premises were of the form, ―If A, then B; If B, then C.‖ Unfortunately, a 
reasonable multi-model conditional syllogism is not readily apparent (Johnson-Laird, personal 
communication, 2008). Thus, to increase the difficulty of conditional syllogisms to approximate 
that of categorical multi-model syllogisms, negation was introduced into the premises, which 
took the form, ―If A, then not B; If not B; then C.‖ There was one syllogism in each Type x 
Models x Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion Believability cell. Eight 
Categorical, Multi-model syllogisms and eight Single-model Conditional syllogisms were 
selected from Experiment 1 for use in the current experiment. Eight Single-model Categorical 
syllogisms and eight Difficult Conditional syllogisms were created for this experiment. 
Syllogisms were comprised of statements that were true or false by definition, with the exception 
of the following syllogisms: Categorical, Multi- and Single-model syllogisms with Believable 
Premises and a Valid, Unbelievable Conclusion; Categorical, Multi-model syllogisms with 
Unbelievable Premises and an Invalid, Unbelievable Conclusion; and Conditional, Single-model 
and Difficult syllogisms with Believable Premises and a Valid, Unbelievable Conclusion. 
Twenty undergraduates who did not participate in this experiment rated the believability of the 
statements used within the syllogisms in an online pilot experiment (these data are presented in 
Appendix B). 
Procedure 
 All participants were tested individually. Syllogisms were presented to participants on a 
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computer using E-Prime v1.2 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2001)  software which 
recorded participants‘ responses and response latencies to each syllogism (from the onset of the 
problem on the screen to the participant‘s key press). Syllogisms and instructions were presented 
in black, 18 point Courier New font against a white background. The following instructions were 
presented to participants on the computer screen and verbally by the researcher:  
This is an experiment to test people‘s reasoning ability. This task contains 32 problems. 
Each problem contains two statements followed by a conclusion. You are asked to 
determine if the conclusions may be logically deduced from the statements. If you judge 
that the conclusion necessarily follows from the statements (i.e., that it is a valid 
conclusion based on the information given in the two statements), you should answer by 
pressing the ‗z‘ key. Otherwise, press the ‗m‘ key to indicate that the conclusion is 
invalid. Please take your time and ensure that you have the right answer before 
answering. 
 
Participants had the opportunity to ask the experimenter any questions about the task 
after hearing the instructions. Participants then completed two practice syllogisms and the 32 
syllogisms created for this experiment. Each syllogism was presented individually and in a 
different random order for each participant. Syllogisms remained on the screen until the 
participant made a response. When the participant pressed a key indicating their judgment about 
the conclusion, the next syllogism appeared on the screen after a 1000 millisecond delay. After 
responding to all 32 syllogisms, participants were debriefed.   
Results 
Response Data 
 Proportion of conclusion endorsement is depicted for Conditional Syllogisms with 
Believable and Unbelievable Premises and Categorical Syllogisms with Believable and 
Unbelievable Premises in Figures 5 and 6, respectively. Endorsement rates were submitted to a 2 













Figure 5. Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 








































































Categorical Syllogisms with Believable Premises 
 
 
Categorical Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises 
 
Figure 6. Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 






































































Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 (Conclusion Validity: Valid, Invalid) x 2 (Conclusion 
Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 (Models: Multiple, Single) repeated measures 
ANOVA.  
Before other results are addressed, general effects of the number of models will be 
reported to ensure that this manipulation was effective. Then, as in Experiment 1 (and for all 
subsequent experiments), results will be discussed first in terms of overall belief bias.  Second, 
the three-way interaction between Syllogism Type, Premise Believability, and Conclusion 
Believability will be examined to determine whether effects of Conclusion Believability vary as 
a function of Syllogism Type and Premise Believability. Next, the interaction between Syllogism 
Type and Premise Believability will be discussed to determine whether participants endorsed 
more conclusions following from Believable than Unbelievable Premises for Conditional 
compared to Categorical Syllogisms. Other results can be found in Appendix C. 
Number of Models Manipulation. There was a Models x Conclusion Validity interaction, 
F(1,39) = 5.21, MSE = .117, p < .05, η
2 
= .118, indicating that effects of Conclusion Validity 
were greater for one-model than for multi-model syllogisms. In other words, participants were 
less successful at distinguishing valid from invalid conclusion for multi-model than for single 
model syllogisms. There was no Type x Models x Conclusion Validity interaction, F(1,39) = 
0.63, MSE = .125, p = .408, η
2 
= .018, indicating that effects of Conclusion Validity were weaker 
for multi-model syllogisms for both Categorical and Conditional Syllogisms, although difficulty 
was manipulated for conditional syllogisms in lieu of number of models. Thus, difficulty was 
successfully manipulated and was manipulated equally across syllogism type.  
Overall Belief Bias Effect. Overall, the main effects typically observed in studies of the 
belief bias were found: There were main effects of Conclusion Believability, F(1,39) = 54.39, 
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MSE = .341, p < .001, η
2 
= .582, and Validity, F(1,39) =37.23, MSE = .498, p < .001, η
2 
= .488. 
The interaction between Conclusion Validity and Believability typical of the belief bias effect 
was not significant when collapsed across Syllogism Type, F(1,39) = 1.56, MSE = .162, p = 
.218, η
2 
= .039. However, there was a three-way interaction between Type, Conclusion Validity, 
and Conclusion Believability, F(1,39) = 6.55, MSE = .122, p <.05, η
2 
= .114. To unpack this 
three-way interaction, endorsement rates for Categorical and Conditional Syllogisms were 
submitted to separate 2 (Conclusion Validity) x 2 (Conclusion Believability) repeated measures 
ANOVAs. The typical interaction between Conclusion Validity and Believability was significant 
for Categorical Syllogisms, F(1,39) = 5.28, MSE = .740, p < .05, η
2 
= .119, but was not 
significant for Conditional Syllogisms, F(1,39) = 0.77, MSE = .396, p = .385, η
2 
= .019.  
Effects of Conclusion Believability as a Function of Syllogism Type and Premise 
Believability. Crucially, there was a three-way interaction between Type, Premise Believability, 
and Conclusion Believability, F(1,39) = 24.25, MSE = .167, p < .001, η
2 
= .383. Separate two-
way repeated measures ANOVAs computed for Categorical and Conditional syllogisms revealed 
that there was a significant interaction between Premise Believability and Conclusion 
Believability for Categorical Syllogisms, F(1,39) = 33.76, MSE = .140, p <.001, η
2 
= .464. 
Paired-sample t-tests were computed to address this interaction. Importantly, Conclusion 
Believability only affected conclusion endorsement when premises were believable, t(39) = 7.17, 
p < .001, but not when they were unbelievable, t(39) = 0.46, p = .648.  For Conditional 
Syllogisms, Premise Believability also interacted with Conclusion Believability, F(1,39) = 12.93, 
MSE = .148, p = .001, η
2 
= .249, however the form of this interaction was such that Conclusion 
Believability had a greater effect on endorsement rates when premises were Believable, t(39) = 
7.34, p < .001 rather than when they were Unbelievable, t(39) = 3.82, p < .001.  
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The four-way interaction between Type, Premise Believability, Conclusion Believability, 
and Models (i.e., number of models required for categorical syllogisms) was non-significant, 
F(1,39) = 1.35, MSE = .113, p = .252, η
2 
= .034, indicating that the pattern of conclusion 
believability results described above does not vary as a function of the number of possible 
models required for the syllogism.  
Conclusion Endorsement for Categorical and Conditional Syllogisms as a Function of 
Premise Believability. Contrary to the results of Experiment 1, Syllogism Type interacted with 
Premise Believability, F(1,39) = 19.02, MSE = .066, p <.001, η
2 
= .328. For Conditional 
Syllogisms, more conclusions following from Believable Premises were endorsed than those 
following from Unbelievable Premises, t(39) = 3.65, p = .001. There was no overall effect of 
Premise Believability on conclusion endorsement for Categorical Syllogisms, t(39) = 0.41, p = 
.685. Again, this interaction was not qualified by the number of models required, F(1,39) = 0.70, 
MSE = .018, p = .408, η
2 
= .018. 
Response Latency Data 
Response Latencies
1
 as a function of Conclusion Validity and Believability are shown for 
Conditional Syllogisms with Believable and Unbelievable Premises and Categorical Syllogisms 
with Believable and Unbelievable Premises in Figures 7 and 8, respectively.  
Response Latencies were submitted to a 2 (Type: Conditional, Categorical) x 2 (Models: Single, 
Multi-model) 2 (Premise Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 (Conclusion Validity: 
Valid, Invalid) x 2 (Conclusion Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) repeated measures 
ANOVA. 
                                                          
1
 An outlier analysis was carried out and response latencies that were outside of three standard deviations of 
the mean for each cell were removed. Because the pattern of data remained identical to when all scores were 
included, and to remain consistent with other experiments examining response latencies and deductive 





Conditional Syllogisms with Believable Premises 
 
 
Conditional Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises 
 
Figure 7. Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and Believability for 































































Figure 8. Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and Believability for 


















































For this and all subsequent experiments, response latency data will be discussed, first, in 
terms of interactions between Conclusion Validity and Conclusion Believability and other 
factors to determine for which syllogisms Conclusion Believability affected response latency. 
Second, the two-way Syllogism Type by Premise Believability interaction will be examined to 
determine whether participants spent longer reasoning about Conditional Syllogisms with 
Believable than Unbelievable Premises compared to Categorical Syllogisms. Other effects are 
reported in Appendix C. 
Effects of Conclusion Believability. There was a significant three-way interaction 
between Syllogism Type, Conclusion Validity, and Conclusion Believability, F(1,39) = 4.66, 
MSE = 8.753x10
7
, p <.05, η
2 
= .107, and a four-way interaction between Syllogism Type, 
Premise Believability, Conclusion Validity, and Conclusion Believability, F(1,39) = 12.09, MSE 
= 1.103 x10
8
, p = .001, η
2 
= .237. To address these interactions, separate 2 (Premise 
Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 (Conclusion Validity: Valid, Invalid) x 2 
(Conclusion Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) repeated measures ANOVAs were 
conducted with Categorical and Conditional response latencies. For Categorical Syllogisms,  
there was a highly significant interaction between Premise Believability, Conclusion Validity, 
and Conclusion Believability, F(1,39) = 19.92, MSE = 8.831 x10
7
, p <.001, η
2 
= .338. Separate 2 
(Conclusion Validity: Valid, Invalid) x 2(Conclusion Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) 
repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for Believable and Unbelievable Premises. Here, 
there was a significant interaction between Conclusion Validity and Conclusion Believability 
when premises were believable, F(1,39) = 20.45, MSE = 2.995 x10
7
, p <.001, η
2 
= .334, such that 
response latencies were greater when the believability and validity of the conclusion conflicted. 





, p = <.05, η
2 
= .112. The nature of this interaction, however, differed from that of 
believable premises. Specifically, for unbelievable premises, participants were actually faster to 
reason about conflict problems.   
 For Conditional Syllogisms, Conclusion Validity and Believability interacted, F(1,39) = 
14.43, MSE = 9.040 x10
7
, p < .001, η
2 
= .270. Here, participants spent longer reasoning about 
problems in which the Validity and Believability of the conclusion conflicted. However, unlike 
the Categorical Syllogisms, there was no significant three-way interaction between Premise 
Believability, Conclusion Validity, and Conclusion Believability, F(1,39) = 1.08, MSE = 8.735 
x10
7
, p =.306, η
2 
= .027. There was no interaction between Number of Models, Type, Premise 
Believability, Conclusion Validity, and Conclusion Believability, F(1,39) = 0.07, MSE = 1.019 
x10
8
, p =.798, η
2 
= .002, indicating that the effects discussed above did not vary as a function of 
the number of models.  
 Effects of Premise Believability for Conditional Syllogisms compared to Categorical 
Syllogisms. There was a significant interaction between Syllogism Type and Premise 
Believability, F(1,39) = 5.66, MSE = 1.334 x10
8
, p <.05, η
2 
= .127. Paired-samples t-tests 
indicated that participants took significantly longer to reason about Conditional Syllogisms with 
Unbelievable Premises than with Believable Premises, t(39) = 4.25, p <.001. The difference in 
response latencies between Believable and Unbelievable Premises for Categorical Syllogisms, 
however,  fell short of significance, t(39) = 1.89, p = .066. There was no three-way interaction 
between Number of Models, Type, and Premise Believability, F(1,39) = 0.27, MSE = 6.160 
x10
7
, p =.602, η
2 
= .007, indicating that the effects outlined above were not affected by number 





In general, the predictions of the theory of premise evaluation outlined in the introduction 
were supported. For conditional syllogisms, participants took longer to reason about syllogisms 
with believable than with unbelievable premises. Further, for both believable and unbelievable 
premises, there is evidence that participants took conclusion believability into account. 
Specifically, for both premise types, Conclusion Validity interacted with Conclusion 
Believability, thus replicating and extending the findings of Ball et al. (2006) that participants 
spend longer on problems in which the validity and believability of the conclusion conflicted. 
These results are consistent with the theory that reasoners initially assume that conditional 
premises are true, and reason about the conclusion under this assumption. After, or otherwise 
independent of, reasoning about the conclusion, participants may discredit unbelievable 
premises, which explains the extra time spent on problems with unbelievable premises.  
 For categorical premises, the trend for participants to spend longer on syllogisms with 
unbelievable premises fell short of significance. Interestingly, there was no effect of conclusion 
believability for syllogisms with unbelievable premises in the predicted direction. Indeed, 
conclusion validity and believability interacted for both believable and unbelievable premises, 
but the nature of this interaction differed. For believable premises, the interaction resembled that 
of conditional syllogisms: participants spent longer reasoning about syllogisms for which the 
believability and validity of the conclusion conflicted. For unbelievable premises, however, 
participants were faster to respond to these conflict problems, particularly those with valid, 
unbelievable conclusions. If participants took the believability of the conclusion into account, 
they would not be expected to be faster on conflict problems, given that responses elicited by the 
validity and believability of the conclusion are in opposition. Thus, the finding that participants 
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were faster on conflict problems is strong evidence that conclusion believability was not 
accounted for during the reasoning process when premises were unbelievable. In fact, it may be 
the case that conclusion believability was ignored in such a way that facilitated reasoning on 
conflict problems. 
Overall, these results suggest that, for categorical syllogisms, participants evaluate the 
believability of premises when they first encounter them. Because participants do not accept 
unbelievable premises and then disbelieve them (that is, there is one step of evaluation for both 
believable and unbelievable premises), they do not spend significantly longer reasoning about 
problems with unbelievable premises. Further, when premises are unbelievable, participants do 
not spend more time reasoning about conflict problems, as would be predicted if conclusion 
believability was taken into account. This suggests that there is something about unbelievable 
premises that triggers participants to ignore believability information in the rest of the problem; 
perhaps it is the case that unbelievable information in the premises acts as a signal that 
believability information in the rest of the problem is unreliable and should be ignored. 
Crucially, the endorsement rates from the current experiment replicated those of 
Experiment 1. Here, conditional syllogisms elicited the main effects typical of belief bias 
regardless of premise believability. That is, participants endorsed more valid than invalid 
conclusions and more believable than unbelievable conclusions. The typically found interaction 
between conclusion validity and believability, however, was not significant. Unlike in 
Experiment 1, the current experiment replicated the results of Thompson (1996): Participants 
were more likely to judge that a conclusion was valid when it was preceded by believable than 
by unbelievable premises. This finding is also in line with previous studies that have found that 
reasoners are less likely to endorse, or are less confident in, conclusions that follow from 
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uncertain conditionals (e.g., George, 1995, 1997, 1999). Again, these results suggest that 
believable and unbelievable premises are initially treated in the same fashion, however, there is 
an overall bias for participants to respond ―valid‖ for conclusions following from believable 
premises and ―invalid‖ for conclusions following from unbelievable premises. If reasoners 
evaluate premises after the reasoning process, it may be the case that they are then biased to 
endorse conclusions following from sound premises.  
For categorical syllogisms, the typical belief bias results were only found for believable 
premises. When premises are unbelievable, the belief bias effect is suppressed, and only 
conclusion validity affects conclusion endorsement. Again, this suggests that reasoners somehow 
disregard believability information in the conclusion when premises are not believable.  
The effects described above were not dependent upon the number of models required for 
syllogisms. Thus, effects of conclusion believability were absent for categorical syllogisms with 
unbelievable premises for both single and multi-model syllogisms. That the believability of the 
premises influenced belief bias when only one model of the premises was required speaks to how 
powerful premise believability can be in affecting how individuals reason about even simple 
problems. Thus far, there is evidence that reasoners treat the premises of categorical and 
conditional syllogisms in fundamentally different ways. Conditional premises seem to be 
accepted as true prior to the reasoning process, whereas categorical premises seem to be 












Experiments 1 and 2 provide strong evidence for differential effects of premise 
believability on conditional and categorical syllogisms. Following Experiment 1, I had proposed 
a theory for why this is the case: specifically, that reasoners initially assume that conditional 
statements are true, whereas they evaluate the believability of categorical statements as soon as 
they are encoded. The following three experiments will test various aspects of this explanation. 
Most experiments investigating deductive reasoning instruct participants to ―assume that 
premises are true.‖ This is for good reason: Although logically a valid conclusion can follow 
from unbelievable premises, pragmatically this is not the case (Evans, 2005; Politzer & 
Bourmaud, 2002). Experiments 1 and 2 omitted this instruction so that effects of premise 
believability could be fully explored. Even when participants were not instructed to assume that 
premises were true, there was still some evidence of logical reasoning: Conclusion validity 
always affected reasoning such that participants were more likely to endorse valid than invalid 
conclusions.  
The theory is that reasoners assume by default that conditional premises are true prior to 
reasoning about the conclusion, but evaluate the truthfulness of categorical premises before 
reasoning about the conclusion. If this is indeed the case, then emphasizing the importance of 
assuming that premises are true to participants should remove the evaluative step prior to 
conclusion reasoning for categorical syllogisms, thus making categorical syllogisms resemble 
conditional syllogisms in both conclusion endorsement rates and response latency patterns. To 
determine whether conditional and categorical syllogisms differ in the point at which premises 
are evaluated, an experimental group of participants was provided with augmented instructions 
that emphasized that they should always assume premises to be true. Relative to the control 
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group, it was predicted, first, that there should be no differences with respect to conditional 
syllogisms, because participants presumably already assume that premise are true; second, that 
categorical syllogisms should show belief bias whether premises are believable or unbelievable; 
and finally, that there should be evidence of conclusion believability affecting response latencies 
(in the form of longer response latencies for conflict problems) for categorical syllogisms with 
both believable and unbelievable premises. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 85 students (39 male, 46 female, mean age = 19.48 yrs, SD = 1.89 yrs) 
enrolled in psychology courses at the University of Waterloo who participated in exchange for 
course credit. None had reported having taken a course in logic. 
Materials  
 The same 32 syllogisms used in Experiment 2 were used in the current experiment. 
Again, syllogisms were either Conditional or Categorical in Type, had either Believable or 
Unbelievable Premises, Valid or Invalid Conclusions, and Believable or Unbelievable 
Conclusions. 
Procedure 
 Participants were assigned to one of two groups. Participants in the control group (n = 
40) received instructions identical to those in Experiment 2. Participants in the experimental 
group (n = 45) received instructions that emphasized the importance of assuming premises to be 
true (note the text in bold font below; this sentence was not in bold in the actually presented 
instructions): 
This is an experiment to test people‘s reasoning ability. This task contains 32 problems. 
Each problem contains two statements followed by a conclusion. You are asked to 
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determine if the conclusions may be logically deduced from the statements. It is very 
important that you assume that the two statements are true. If you judge that the 
conclusion necessarily follows from the statements (i.e., that it is a valid conclusion based 
on the information given in the two statements), you should answer by pressing the ‗z‘ 
key. Otherwise, press the ‗m‘ key to indicate that the conclusion is invalid. Please take 
your time and ensure that you have the right answer before answering. 
 
 Other than this instructional manipulation for the experimental group, participants in both 
groups were tested in a procedure that was identical to that in Experiment 2. 
Results 
Response Data 
 The proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 
Believability are shown for Conditional Syllogisms with Believable and Unbelievable Premises 
and Categorical Syllogisms with Believable and Unbelievable Premises in Figures 9 and 10, 
respectively, for the Control Group and Figures 11 and 12, respectively, for the Experimental 
Group. Conclusion endorsement rates were submitted to a 2 (Type: Categorical, Conditional) x 2 
(Premise Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 (Conclusion Validity: Valid, Invalid) x 2 
(Conclusion Believability) repeated measures ANOVA with Condition (Control, Experimental) 
as a between subjects variable. Because the number of models required for syllogisms did not 
affect any findings of interest in Experiment 2, number of models was not considered as a factor 
here or in any of the following experiments.  
Overall Belief Bias Effect. Overall, the typical belief bias effect was found: There were 
main effects of Conclusion Believability, F(1,83) = 74.84, MSE = .814, p <.001, η
2 
= .474, and 
Validity, F(1,83) = 102.15, MSE = 1.113, p <.001, η
2 
= .552, and an interaction between 
Conclusion Validity and Believability, F(1,83) = 11.68, MSE = .351, p = .001, η
2 
= .123. 
Effects of Conclusion Believability as a Function of Syllogism Type and Premise 




Conditional Syllogisms with Believable Premises – Control Group 
 
 
Conditional Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises – Control Group 
 
Figure 9. Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 
Believability for Conditional Syllogisms with Believable and Unbelievable Premises for the 








































































Categorical Syllogisms with Believable Premises – Control Group 
 
 
Categorical Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises – Control Group 
 
Figure 10. Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 
Believability for Categorical Syllogisms with Believable and Unbelievable Premises for the 








































































Conditional Syllogisms with Believable Premises – Experimental Group 
 
 
Conditional Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises – Experimental Group 
 
 
Figure 11. Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 









































































Categorical Syllogisms with Believable Premises – Experimental Group 
 
 
Categorical Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises – Experimental Group 
 
Figure 12. Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 







































































F(1,83) = 21.43, MSE = .260, p < .001, η
2 
= .205, which was further qualified by a marginally 
significant interaction between Type, Premise Believability, Conclusions Believability, and 
Condition, F(1,83) = 3.69, MSE = .260, p = .058, η
2 
= .043. To further explore this interaction, 
endorsement rates from the Control Group and Experimental Group were submitted to separate 2 
(Type: Categorical, Conditional) x 2 (Conclusion Validity: Valid, Invalid) x 2 (Conclusion 
Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) repeated measures ANOVAs. For the Control Group, 
there was a highly significant three-way interaction between Type, Premise Believability, and 
Conclusion Believability, F(1,83) = 20.01, MSE = .263, p < .001, η
2 
= .339. These analyses 
revealed that for Categorical Syllogisms, Premise Believability and Conclusion Believability 
interacted, F(1,39) = 37.74, MSE = .524, p < .001, η
2 
= .498, such that Conclusion Believability 
played a role only when Premises were Believable, t(39) = 6.23, p <.001, but not when they were 
Unbelievable, t(39) = 0.15, p = .884. There was no such interaction for Conditional Syllogisms, 
F(1,39) = 0.01, MSE = .673, p = .924, η
2 
= <.001. For the Experimental Group, there was no 
interaction between Premise Believability and Conclusion Believability for either Categorical, 
F(1,44) = 0.94, MSE = .718, p < .338, η
2 
= .021, or Conditional, F(1,44) = 3.78, MSE = .337, p = 
.058, η
2 
= .079, Syllogisms.  
 Conclusion Endorsement for Categorical and Conditional Syllogisms as a Function of 
Premise Believability. There was a significant Type x Premise Believability interaction, F(1,83) 
= 19.40, MSE = .273, p < .001, η
2 
= .189, which was further qualified by a marginally significant 
interaction between Type, Premise Believability, and Condition, F(1,83) = 3.10, MSE = .273, p = 
.082, η
2 
= .036.  To further explore these effects, endorsement rates for the Experimental and 
Control groups were submitted to 2 (Type: Conditional, Categorical) x 2 (Premise Believability: 
Believable, Unbelievable) repeated measures ANOVAs. For the Control group, Type interacted 
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with Premise Believability, F(1,39) = 17.61, MSE = 1.113, p < .001, η
2 
= .311. Paired-samples t-
tests revealed that participants endorsed more conclusions following from Believable Premises 
than from Unbelievable Premises for Conditional Syllogisms, t(39) = 5.56, p <.001. For 
Categorical Syllogisms, however, there was no difference in conclusion endorsement depending 
on Premise Believability, t(39) = 0.92, p = .362. For the Experimental Group, Type and Premise 
Believability did not interact, F(1,44) = 3.78, MSE = 1.073, p = .058, η
2 
= .079. 
Response Latency Data 
 Response Latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and Believability are shown for 
Conditional Syllogisms with Believable and Unbelievable Premises and Categorical Syllogisms 
with Believable and Unbelievable Premises in Figures 13 and 14, respectively, for the Control 
Group, and Figures 15 and 16, respectively, for the Experimental Group. 
Response latencies were submitted to a 2 (Type: Categorical, Conditional) x 2 (Premise 
Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 (Conclusion Validity: Valid, Invalid) x 2 
(Conclusion Believability) repeated measures ANOVA with Condition (Control, Experimental) 
as a between subjects variable.  
Effects of Conclusion Believability. There was a significant four-way interaction between 
Type, Premise Believability, Conclusion Validity, and Conclusion Believability, F(1,83) = 9.41, 
MSE = 1.128 x 10
8
, p <.01, η
2 
= .102. To unpack this four-way interaction, separate 2 (Premise 
Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 (Conclusion Validity: Valid, Invalid) x 2 
(Conclusion Believability) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for Categorical and 
Conditional Syllogisms. For Categorical Syllogisms, there was a significant three-way 
interaction between Premise Believability, Conclusion Validity, and Conclusion Believability, 
F(1,83) = 11.73, MSE = 2.260 x 10
7
, p = .001, η
2 




Conditional Syllogisms with Believable Premises – Control Group 
 
 
Conditional Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises – Control Group 
 
Figure 13. Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and Believability for 




















































Categorical Syllogisms with Believable Premises – Control Group 
 
 
Categorical Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises – Control Group 
 
Figure 14. Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and Believability for 




















































Conditional Syllogisms with Believable Premises – Experimental Group 
 
 
Conditional Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises – Experimental Group  
 
Figure 15. Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and Believability for 




















































Categorical Syllogisms with Believable Premises – Experimental Group 
 
 
Categorical Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises – Experimental Group 
 
Figure 16. Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and Believability for 



















































premises were believable, there was a significant interaction between Conclusion Validity and 
Believability, F(1,83) = 7.12, MSE = 5.701 x 10
7
, p <.01, η
2 
= .079, such that participants took 
longer to reason about conflict problems than non-conflict problems; however, this interaction 
was only marginally significant when premises were unbelievable, F(1,83) = 3.22, MSE = 7.758 
x 10
7
, p = .077, η
2 
= .037. For Conditional Syllogisms, the interaction between Premise 
Believability, Conclusion Validity, and Conclusion Believability was not significant, F(1,83) = 
0.58, MSE = 8.671 x 10
7
, p = .447, η
2 
= .007. The two-way interaction between Conclusion 
Validity and Conclusion Believability for Conditional Syllogisms was significant, F(1,83) = 
8.63, MSE = 4.838 x 10
7
, p <.01, η
2 
= .094, indicating that regardless of premise believability, 
participants spent longer reasoning about conflict problems than non-conflict problems.  
 Effects of Premise Believability for Conditional Syllogisms compared to Categorical 
Syllogisms. There was a Type x Premise Believability interaction, F(1,83) = 8.09, MSE = 1.453 x 
10
8
, p <.01, η
2 
= .089. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that participants reasoned longer about 
Conditional Syllogisms with Unbelievable than Believable Premises, t(84) = 4.84, p <.001. 
There was no difference in response latencies for syllogisms with Believable and Unbelievable 
Premises for Categorical Syllogisms, t(84) = 1.24, p = .218.  
Discussion 
In general, the results were consistent with the predictions of my proposed theory of 
premise evaluation. When participants were told to assume that premises were true, belief bias 
resulted for categorical syllogisms regardless of whether premises were believable or 
unbelievable, and further, there was a trend for participants to spend longer reasoning about 
conflict problems when premises were unbelievable. The control group, who did not receive 
instructions to assume that premises were true, replicated the findings of Experiments 1 and 2: 
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There was no belief bias when categorical premises were unbelievable, and no evidence that 
participants took conclusion believability into account when premises were unbelievable.  
Conditional syllogisms, of which participants are presumed to assume premises are true 
as their default, showed the same effects regardless of instruction and replicated the findings of 
Experiments 1 and 2. Here, belief bias was found regardless of premise believability 
(participants endorsed more valid than invalid and more believable than unbelievable 
conclusions, and there were significant interactions between conclusion validity and 
believability). Thompson‟s (1996) finding was replicated, such that participants endorsed more 
conclusions following from believable than unbelievable premises. Further, as in Experiment 2, 
participants spent longer reasoning about syllogisms with unbelievable premises.  
Overall, these findings support the theory that reasoners automatically assume 
conditional, but not categorical, premises to be true. In the case of conditional syllogisms, this 
assumption leads reasoners to treat believable and unbelievable conditional premises identically 
for the purposes of reasoning about the conclusion. Prior to conclusion reasoning, reasoners may 
evaluate premises and alter responses to be consistent with premise believability. In contrast, for 
categorical syllogisms, it seems as though rather than assuming that the statements are true, 
reasoners evaluate the believability of premises prior to considering the conclusion, and then 
only take into account believability of the conclusion when premises are believable.  
It is proposed that, for conditional syllogisms, reasoners assume by default that premises 
are true, and subsequent to the reasoning process, reject false premises and change responses 
accordingly. This hypothesis can account for why reasoners spend longer reasoning about 
syllogisms with unbelievable than believable premises: Evaluating and disbelieving information 
that was previously accepted takes time (Gilbert, 1991). If instructions to assume that premises 
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are true causes participants to treat categorical premises like conditional ones, then we should 
also see main effects of premise believability on responses and response latencies for categorical 
syllogisms (that is, more “valid” responses and shorter responses latencies for believable than 
unbelievable syllogisms). However, this was not the case: There were equal overall endorsement 
rates and response latencies for believable and unbelievable categorical premises. Although it is 
not entirely clear why this is the case, it points to the fact that, even with instructions to assume 
that premises are true, reasoners nonetheless persist in treating categorical syllogisms differently 
from conditional syllogisms. It may be that when statements are categorical, reasoners are not 
motivated to evaluate them and to discredit false ones, perhaps because, despite instructions to 
assume that premises are true, reasoners could not fully inhibit evaluating categorical premises 
prior to reasoning about the conclusion. Further, although we see effects of conclusion 
believability on endorsement rates when categorical premises were unbelievable, the evidence is 
not as strong for response latencies, arguably a more sensitive measure. That participants were 
only marginally slower on conflict problems for categorical syllogisms with unbelievable 
premises is more evidence that participants may not have completely suppressed the initial 
evaluative component for categorical syllogisms.  
Although under instructions to “assume that premises are true” categorical syllogisms do 
not fully resemble conditional syllogisms, there is still striking evidence that these instructions 
alter how people reason about categorical syllogisms. Experiment 4 will examine another factor 
unique to conditional but not categorical syllogisms that may account for differences observed 






Experiment 3 provided evidence that reasoners assume from the outset that conditional, 
but not categorical, premises are true. Why might this be the case? The conditional and 
categorical statements used in the current experiments are similar in that they make explicit the 
relations among different classes of items. However, these two types of propositions differ in one 
crucial way: Conditional syllogisms contain the powerful word „if.’ The study of this small word 
itself has a rich background in philosophy and psychology alike. In philosophy literature, there is 
some debate as to the meaning of the word, with some claiming that if introduces a categorical 
proposition (e.g., Lewis, 1973; Goodman, 1947) and others claiming that the word introduces a 
suppositional, hypothetical statement (e.g., Mackie, 1973; Barnett, 2006, 2010). These latter 
philosophers propose that „if‟ invites the reader or listener to suppose that something is true. 
Some psychologists agree; Evans and Over (2004) state that “„if‟ is one of the most important 
and interesting words in the human language. It is used to express hypothetical thought, which is 
an essential part of human reasoning and decision making” (p.1) and that “„if‟ must have, in 
some sense, a hypothetical or suppositional evaluation...”  (p.171). Further, according to a recent 
theory of conditional reasoning, known as the Suppositional Theory of Conditionals (Evans, 
Over, & Handley, 2005), “conditionals cue a mental simulation in which people suppose the 
antecedent (if statement) to be true and then assess their degree of belief in the consequent (then 
statement)” (Hadjichristidis et al., 2007, p. 2052).  
Perhaps it is this small word that is responsible for the differences in how people treat 
conditional and categorical premises. It is plausible that the word „if‟ itself invites the reader to 
think hypothetically and to assume that the following proposition is true. On the other hand, 
categorical statements are presented in a more factual manner, and may signal the reader or 
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listener to accept the statement only if it is true. Experiment 4 will determine whether this is in 
fact the case using a simple manipulation: adding the word „if‟ prior to categorical statements. If 
this word signals to reasoners that they should assume that premises that follow „if‟ are true, 
even momentarily, then the endorsement patterns and response latencies of categorical 
syllogisms should resemble those for conditional syllogisms. That is, the word „if‟ should halt 
the execution of evaluative processing of categorical premises that is otherwise hypothesized to 
occur prior to the reasoning process. 
The following predictions can be made. If „if‟ causes reasoners to assume that conditional 
premises are true, then first, adding „if‟ to categorical syllogisms should produce a belief bias 
effect even given unbelievable premises; and second, participants should spend longer reasoning 
about conflict than non-conflict problems for categorical premises regardless of premise 
believability and should spend longer reasoning about problems with unbelievable than 
believable premises.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 90 students (31 male, 59 female, mean age = 19.55 yrs, SD = 1.96 yrs) 
enrolled in psychology courses at the University of Waterloo who participated in exchange for 
course credit. None had reported having taken a course in logic. 
Materials  
 Stimuli comprised the same syllogisms used in Experiments 2 and 3. For the Control 
Group, syllogisms were presented exactly as they were in previous experiments. For the 
Experimental Group, categorical syllogisms were altered slightly by adding the word ‗if‘ to the 
beginning of premises and the word ‗Then‘ to the beginning of conclusions, as depicted below: 
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If no A are B, and 
If some C are B, 
Then, some C are not A 
 
Conditional syllogisms were unchanged from Experiments 2 and 3. 
Procedure 
 Participants were assigned to one of two groups. Both groups received instructions 
identical to those in Experiment 2 and were tested under the same procedure, with the exception 




 Proportions of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 
Believability are shown for Conditional Syllogisms with Believable and Unbelievable Premises 
and Categorical Syllogisms with Believable and Unbelievable Premises in Figures 17 and 18, 
respectively, for the Control Group, and Figures 19 and 20, respectively, for the Experimental 
Group. Conclusion endorsement rates were submitted to a 2 (Type: Categorical, Conditional) x 2 
(Premise Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 (Conclusion Validity: Valid, Invalid) x 2 
(Conclusion Believability) repeated measures ANOVA with Condition (Control, Experimental) 
as a between subjects variable.  
Overall Belief Bias Effect. Again, as with Experiments 1, 2, and 3, the belief bias effect 
was found. Specifically, there were main effects of Conclusion Believability, F(1,88) = 110.02, 
MSE = 1.104, p <.001, η
2 
= .556, and Validity, F(1,88) = 109.87, MSE = .591, p <.001, η
2 




Conditional Syllogisms with Believable Premises – Control Group 
 
 
Conditional Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises – Control Group 
 
Figure 17. Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 








































































Categorical Syllogisms with Believable Premises – Control Group 
 
 
Categorical Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises – Control Group 
 
Figure 18. Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 








































































Conditional Syllogisms with Believable Premises – Experimental Group 
 
 
Conditional Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises – Experimental Group 
 
Figure 19. Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 








































































Categorical Syllogisms with Believable Premises – Experimental Group 
 
 
Categorical Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises – Experimental Group 
 
Figure 20. Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 







































































and an interaction between Conclusion Validity and Believability, F(1,88) = 10.32, MSE = .253, 
p <.001, η
2 
= .105.  
Effects of Conclusion Believability as a Function of Syllogism Type and Premise 
Believability. The four-way Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion Believability x Condition 
interaction was not significant, F(1,88) = 1.64, MSE = .274, p = .203, η
2 
= .018. However, 
because the influence of condition on the three-way interaction between Syllogism Type, 
Premise Believability, and Conclusion Believability is essential to the hypotheses, this three-way 
interaction was examined separately for each condition. For the Control Condition, there was a 
significant three-way interaction between these three factors, F(1,39) = 12.66, MSE = .218, p = 
.001, η
2 
= .245. To characterize this three-way interaction, conclusion endorsement rates for 
participants in the Control Condition were isolated by Syllogism Type and were subjected to two 
separate 2(Premise Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) x 2(Conclusion Believability: 
Believable, Unbelievable) repeated measures ANOVAs. Here, there was no interaction between 
Premise Believability and Conclusion Believability for Conditional Syllogisms, F(1,39) = 1.51, 
MSE = .500, p = .226, η
2 
= .037. However, similar to previous experiments, Premise 
Believability and Conclusion Believability did interact for Categorical Syllogisms, F(1,39) = 
8.19, MSE = .556, p <.01, η
2 
= .174. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that participants endorsed 
more Believable than Unbelievable Conclusions following from Believable Premises, t(39) = 
4.46, p <.001, whereas Conclusion Believability did not affect endorsement of conclusions 
following Unbelievable Premises, t(39) = 1.36, p =.183.  In short, in the control condition, the 
key finding reported in the previous experiments was replicated:  Premise believability affects 
the magnitude of belief bias for categorical but not for conditional syllogisms. 
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There was no interaction between Type, Premise Believability, and Conclusion 
Believability for the Experimental Group, F(1,49) = 2.25, MSE = .319, p = .140, η
2 
= .044, 
suggesting that Premise Believability did not differentially affect the magnitude of the belief bias 
for Categorical and Conditional Syllogisms.  
Conclusion Endorsement for Categorical and Conditional Syllogisms as a Function of 
Premise Believability. Although there was a Type x Premise Believability interaction, F(1,88) = 
13.94, MSE = .261, p <.001, η
2 
= .137, the Type x Premise Believability x Condition interaction 
was not significant, F(1,88) = 0.26, MSE = .261, p = .613, η
2 
= .003.  Overall, premise 
Believability did not affect overall conclusion endorsement for Categorical Syllogisms, t(89) = 
1.54, p = .127. Conversely, participants endorsed more conclusions following Believable than 
Unbelievable Premises for Conditional Syllogisms, t(89) = 3.41, p =.001.  
Response Latency Data 
 Response Latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and Believability are shown for 
Conditional Syllogisms with Believable and Unbelievable Premises and Categorical Syllogisms 
with Believable and Unbelievable Premises in Figures 21 and 22, respectively, for the Control 
Group, and Figures 23 and 24, respectively, for the Experimental Group. Response Latencies 
were submitted to a 2 (Type: Categorical, Conditional) x 2 (Premise Believability: Believable, 
Unbelievable) x 2 (Conclusion Validity: Valid, Invalid) x 2 (Conclusion Believability) repeated 
measures ANOVA with Condition (Control, Experimental) as a between subjects variable.  
Effects of Conclusion Believability. Although the five-way interaction between Type, 
Premise Believability, Conclusion Validity, Conclusion Believability, and Condition was not 
significant, F(1,88) = 1.86, MSE = 5.678 x 10
7
, p = .176, η
2 





Conditional Syllogisms with Believable Premises – Control Group 
 
 
Conditional Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises – Control Group 
 
Figure 21. Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and Believability for 




















































Categorical Syllogisms with Believable Premises – Control Group 
 
 
Categorical Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises – Control Group 
 
Figure 22. Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and Believability for 




















































Conditional Syllogisms with Believable Premises – Experimental Group 
 
 
Conditional Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises – Experimental Group 
 
Figure 23. Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and Believability for 




















































Categorical Syllogisms with Believable Premises – Experimental Group 
 
 
Categorical Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises – Experimental Group 
 
Figure 24. Response latencies as a function of Conclusion Validity and Believability for 



















































Validity: Valid, Invalid) x 2 (Conclusion Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) repeated 
measures ANOVAs were conducted to determine whether Conclusion Believability differentially 
influenced response latencies for Categorical and Conditional Syllogisms with Believable and 
Unbelievable Premises in the Experimental and Control Conditions. 
For the Control Condition, Conclusion Validity and Conclusion Believability interacted 
for Categorical Syllogisms with Believable Premises, F(1,39) = 7.16, MSE = 4.406 x 10
7
, p <.05, 
η
2 
= .155. However, this interaction fell short of significance for Conditional Syllogisms with 
Believable Premises, F(1,39) = 1.54, MSE = 5.178 x 10
7
, p = .223, η
2 
= .038, and for 
Unbelievable Premises F(1,39) = 2.42, MSE = 8.365 x 10
7
, p = .128, η
2 
= .059. There was also 
no such interaction for Categorical Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises, F(1,39) = 0.003, 
MSE = 5.273 x 10
7
, p =.957, η
2 
<.001, suggesting that conflicting Conclusion Validity and 
Conclusion Believability did not differentially interfere with reasoning. 
For the Experimental Condition, there was a marginally significant interaction between 
Conclusion Validity and Conclusion Believability for Conditional Syllogisms with Believable 
Premises, F(1,49) = 3.93, MSE = 4.441 x 10
7
, p = .053, η
2 
= .074; this interaction for 
Unbelievable Premises fell short of significance, F(1,49) = 2.22, MSE = 7.666 x 10
7
, p = .142, η
2 
= .043.  The interaction between Conclusion Validity and Conclusion Believability for 
Categorical Syllogisms with Believable Premises was not significant, F(1,49) = 2.31, MSE = 
2.097 x 10
7
, p = .135, η
2 
= .045, however, there was a main effect of Conclusion Believability, 
F(1,49) = 14.28, MSE = 2.869 x 10
7
, p <.001, η
2 
= .226. Thus, even though the interaction 
between Conclusion Validity and Believability was not significant, Conclusion Believability did 
influence response latencies. Crucially, there was a significant interaction between Conclusion 
 
79 
Validity and Conclusion Believability for Categorical Syllogisms with Unbelievable premises, 
F(1,49) = 4.46, MSE = 3.383 x 10
7
, p <.05, η
2 
= .083.  
 Effects of Premise Believability for Conditional Syllogisms compared to Categorical 
Syllogisms. Neither the Syllogism Type x Premise Believability x Condition interaction, F(1,88) 
= 0.40, MSE = 6.133 x 10
7
, p =.526, η
2 
= .005, nor Syllogism Type x Premise Believability 
Interaction, F(1,88) = 1.98, MSE = 6.133 x 10
7
, p = .163, η
2 
= .022, were significant.  
Discussion 
These results partially support predictions made by the theory of premise evaluation set 
out earlier. First and most central, adding „if‟ to categorical premises elicited a belief bias effect 
even when premises were unbelievable. Second, participants were slower to reason about 
problems in which the validity and believability of the conclusion conflicted for categorical 
syllogisms with unbelievable premises. Taken along with the results of Experiment 3, these 
results support the theory that „if‟ leads reasoners to assume that premises are true and to treat 
believable and unbelievable premises similarly.  
As in Experiment 3, the experimental manipulation did not cause data for categorical 
syllogisms to fully resemble conditional syllogisms: Participants shown categorical syllogisms 
with „if‟ did not endorse more conclusions following from believable than unbelievable premises 
and did not spend longer reasoning about problems with unbelievable premises. However, note 
that although reasoners did accept more conclusions following from believable than unbelievable 
conditional premises in this experiment, participants did not spend longer reasoning about 
conditional syllogisms with believable than unbelievable premises, in contrast to Experiments 2 
and 3. Thus, reasoners may not be reliably motivated to discredit false information that was once 
believed, regardless of the format of the premise. Further, although „if‟ was added to categorical 
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statements, they are still essentially different from categorical statements. Conditional syllogisms 
contain three full „If/Then‟ statements, whereas categorical syllogisms, taken as a whole, contain 
only one entire „If/Then‟ statement. This essential difference is unavoidable without altering the 
type of syllogism and may be the reason why results of categorical syllogisms, under instructions 
to assume that premises are true or with the addition of „if,‟ do not fully resemble those of 
conditional syllogisms. Nonetheless, given the limitations imposed by the logical structure of 
categorical syllogisms, there is compelling evidence that the word „if‟ is the key difference 
between categorical and conditional syllogisms that leads reasoners to assume that conditional 
premises are true but to evaluate the believability of categorical premises. It should also be noted 
that the conclusions drawn from Experiments 3 and 4 are based in a large part on marginally 
significant higher-order interactions. This is not surprising, given the robustness of the belief bias 
effect itself and how difficult it is to manipulate this effect. That being said, future research 
should strive to develop more powerful methods of modulating bias when reasoning with these 






Thus far, there is evidence that conditional and categorical syllogisms differ in how 
premises are considered. I have hypothesized, specifically, that for conditional syllogisms, 
reasoners automatically assume that premises are true and then, at least sometimes, disbelieve 
false premises either after or otherwise independently of reasoning about the conclusion. For 
categorical syllogisms, reasoners evaluate the believability of premises right away, and then 
seem to disregard believability information in the conclusion when premises are unbelievable. 
Although previous experiments have investigated how premises are evaluated, there remain 
some unanswered questions: First, what is the time course of reasoning, particularly for 
conditional syllogisms? Do reasoners evaluate premise believability after the conclusion has 
been reasoned about, or does this happen in parallel with reasoning about the conclusion? 
Second, why is belief bias not evident for categorical syllogisms with unbelievable premises? 
The final experiment of this dissertation was designed to answer these questions using two 
different yet converging approaches, eye-tracking and a memory task.  
Eye-Tracking 
Eye-movement monitoring has been used for decades in cognitive psychology research 
(Rayner, 1998) under the assumption that fixations and eye movements act as a proxy for where 
one is directing his or her attention. This approach has been applied to various reasoning 
modalities, including insight problem solving (Grant & Spivey, 2003), analogical reasoning 
(Bethell-Fox, Lohman, & Snow, 1984), the Wason Card Selection Task (Ball, Lucas, Miles, & 
Gale, 2003), and spatial reasoning (Korner & Gilchrist, 2004). Use of eye-tracking methodology 
in the study of deductive reasoning is a relatively new approach to disentangling reasoning 
processes. Researchers who have employed it (e.g., Ball et al., 2006; Espino, Santamaria, 
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Meseguer, & Carreiras, 2005) report success in using the technology to support or refute theories 
of reasoning. Particularly, Ball et al. (2006) examined premise inspection times for categorical 
syllogisms before and after the conclusion was attended to, and reported that pre-conclusion 
premise inspection times did not differ according to the validity or believability of the 
conclusion. However, they found that participants looked significantly longer at premises after 
looking at the conclusion when the validity and believability of the conclusion conflicted. They 
used these findings to support theories of deductive reasoning that posit that the believability and 
validity of the conclusion itself interact to determine how reasoning progresses.  
The success of prior experiments using eye-tracking technology in supporting or refuting 
reasoning theories points to the utility of monitoring eye movements during reasoning, yet no 
eye-tracking experiments to date have examined how eye-movements differ for categorical and 
conditional syllogistic reasoning and for believable and unbelievable premises. The current 
experiment will do just that, by comparing premise and conclusion inspection times for 
categorical and conditional syllogisms with believable and unbelievable premises. Although the 
previous experiments in this thesis have provided global response latencies, up until this time, it 
has not been possible to determine how much of this time participants spent on the premises and 
how much they spent on the conclusion. Eye-tracking can be used to classify response time 
based on the component of the problem to which participants are attending.  
According to the Mental Models account, reasoners begin the reasoning process by 
forming a model of the premises. Next, they determine whether the conclusion is valid or invalid 
given this model. Here, the key assumption will be made that once the conclusion is attended to, 
the process of reasoning about the conclusion begins. Under this assumption, other measures of 
interest include how often reasoners refer back to the premises after attending to the conclusion 
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(which can be taken as an index of the extent to which participants consider the premises after 
beginning to reason about the conclusion), and how much time is spent attending to premises 
before and after the conclusion has been attended to (or how much time is dedicated to the 
premises pre- and post-reasoning). 
Given the theory of premise evaluation that I propose in this dissertation, the following 
predictions can be drawn. First, if reasoners assume that conditional premises are true and then 
disbelieve unbelievable premises after reasoning, then they should refer back to the premises 
after the conclusion has been looked at more often than they do for categorical syllogisms, which 
reasoners are thought to have evaluated prior to the reasoning process. Further, categorical 
premises should be attended to longer, and any effects of premise believability should be evident, 
before the conclusion is attended to rather than after, because this is when premise evaluation is 
thought to take place. The converse should be true for conditional syllogisms, if evaluation 
occurs after reasoning.  Finally, if reasoners disregard conclusion believability for categorical 
syllogisms with unbelievable premises, there should be no evidence of conclusion believability 
affecting eye movements. 
Memory for Syllogisms 
 Examining memory for content that is reasoned about is a novel approach in deductive 
reasoning, however, its use is warranted to address a key question: Do reasoners ignore 
believability information in categorical syllogisms with unbelievable premises? Take the 
following syllogism: 
 
No animals are dogs 
Some lions are dogs 
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Therefore, some lions are not animals 
 
 This categorical syllogism has two unbelievable premises, and according to Experiments 
1 through 4, reasoners do not show belief bias for this type of syllogism. It is not yet known why 
this is the case. It is possible that, when given unbelievable premises, which they are thought to 
evaluate prior to reasoning, reasoners realize that the content of the problem will not help them 
reason about the conclusion, and may in fact hinder them. Reasoners may then abstract the 
logical form from the syllogism and disregard the unbelievable content, representing it like so: 
 
   No A are B 
   Some C are B 
   Therefore, some C are not A 
 
 Reasoning about this syllogism as opposed to the above syllogism, if done correctly, 
yields the same “valid” response without being hindered by the unbelievable content of the 
above syllogism. Thus, when confronted with a categorical syllogism with premises that are 
recognized to be unbelievable, reasoners may treat the syllogism as an abstract problem. If this is 
the case, participants should show reduced memory for the content of these problems relative to 
categorical syllogisms with believable premises and conditional syllogisms with believable and 
unbelievable premises. In these situations, reasoners would not abstract the logical form, and 
therefore would devote more processing to the content, making it more memorable. This 





 Participants were 39 students (16 male, 23 female, mean age = 20.89 yrs, SD = 2.12 yrs) 
enrolled in undergraduate Psychology courses at the University of Waterloo who participated in 
exchange for bonus course credit. All participants reported that they had never taken a course in 
logic and reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
Stimulus Displays 
 Each display contained one syllogism in black 28 point Calibri font against a white 
background. The three components of the syllogism (i.e., each premise and the conclusion) were 
on separate horizontal lines separated vertically by 3.8 cm, and the entire syllogism was centred 
both horizontally and vertically on the display. Displays were viewed from a distance of 61 cm. 
Each statement measured between 9.5 cm to 32.0 cm horizontally, depending on the length of the 
statement, and 0.8 cm vertically, corresponding to a visual angle of 0.75º. 
Eye-Tracking Apparatus 
 An ASL Eye-Trac6 Desktop Model eye-tracking system monitored eye-movements. A 
chin rest was positioned 61 cm away from the display screen and camera to ensure that 
participants‘ head movements were kept to a minimum. A camera situated beneath the display 
screen recorded pupil reflections of the most accurately calibrated eye. Prior to beginning the 
experiment, the system was calibrated for each participant using a nine-point calibration 
procedure.  
 Two display screens were used: a Hanns-G PC compatible screen set at a resolution of 
1024 x 768 pixels screen presented stimuli to participants, and a second monitor presented the 
displays and gaze position to the experimenter in real-time, allowing the experimenter to assess 
accuracy. Stimuli were programmed and presented to participants using E-Prime v1.2 (Schneider 




 The experimental session began with orienting participants to the eye-tracking apparatus 
and calibrating the eye-tracking system. Participants then proceeded through the reasoning task 
in a procedure that was identical to that of Experiment 2.  
 The eye-tracking portion of the experiment ended at the completion of the reasoning task. 
Participants then completed several measures of cognitive abilities, which will not be discussed 
further. Approximately one hour after the completion of the reasoning task, participants were 
given a free recall memory test in which they were asked to recall as many of the content words 
from the syllogisms as they could remember. Participants were given a sheet to write down these 
words with the following instructions: 
Think back to first task from this experiment. You were asked to determine 
whether a conclusion was valid or invalid based on given information. Your job in 
this task is to write down all of the topics that you can remember from those 
problems. 
For example, if you remember reasoning about the following problem: 
 
No spoons are knives 
     Some silver things are knives 
     Therefore, some spoons are not silver things 
 
You could write down spoons, knives, or silver things. (you do not need to write 
down words like no or are). 
Write down as many key words as you can remember. 
 
Participants were given as much time as they needed to write down (free recall) as many words 
as they could remember. After this task, participants were debriefed. 
Results 
Response Data 
 The proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 
Believability are shown for Conditional Syllogisms with Believable and Unbelievable Premises 
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and Categorical Syllogisms with Believable and Unbelievable Premises in Figures 25 and 26, 
respectively. Conclusion endorsement rates were submitted to a 2 (Type: Conditional, 
Categorical) x 2 (Premise Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 (Conclusion Validity: 
Valid, Invalid) x 2 (Conclusion Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) repeated measures 
ANOVA.  
Overall Belief Bias Effect. The main effects characteristic of the belief bias effect were 
found: Participants endorsed more Believable than Unbelievable Conclusions, F(1,38) = 48.76, 
MSE = .581, p < .001, η
2 
= .562, and more Valid than Invalid Conclusions, F(1,38) = 7.74, MSE 
= 1.715, p <.01, η
2 
= .169. The typical interaction between Conclusion Validity and Believability 
was non-significant, F(1,38) = 0.60, MSE = .452, p = .444, η
2 
= .016. 
Effects of Conclusion Believability as a Function of Syllogism Type and Premise 
Believability. The critical interaction between Type, Premise Believability, and Conclusion 
Believability was significant, F(1,38) = 4.95, MSE = .272, p <.05, η
2 
= .115. To explore this 
interaction, endorsement rates for Categorical and Conditional Syllogisms were submitted to two 
separate 2 (Premise Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 (Conclusion Believability: 
Believable, Unbelievable) repeated measures ANOVAs. For Conditional Syllogisms, Premise 
Believability did not interact with Conclusion Believability, F(1,37) = 0.34, MSE = .348, p .563, 
η
2 
= .009. For Categorical Syllogisms, there was a significant Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability interaction, F(1,37) = 15.95, MSE = .253, p <.001, η
2 
= .301. Paired-samples t-tests 
revealed that participants endorsed more Believable than Unbelievable Conclusions when 
categorical premises were believable, t(37) = 5.87, p < .001. Conversely, Conclusion 
Believability did not affect conclusion endorsement when premises were unbelievable, t(37) = 




Conditional Syllogisms with Believable Premises 
 
 
Conditional Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises 
 
Figure 25. Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 








































































Categorical Syllogisms with Believable Premises 
 
 
Categorical Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises 
 
Figure 26. Proportion of conclusions endorsed as valid as a function of Conclusion Validity and 






































































Conclusion Endorsement for Categorical and Conditional Syllogisms as a Function of 
Premise Believability. There was a significant Type x Premise Believability interaction, F(1,38) 
= 8.20, MSE = .361, p <.01, η
2 
= .178. Participants endorsed more conclusions following from 
Believable than from Unbelievable Premises for Conditional Syllogisms, F(1,37) = 11.08, MSE 
= .343, p <.01, η
2 
= .230; whereas there was no difference in conclusion endorsement based on 





 Of the 39 participants who participated in this Experiment, 25 yielded usable eye-
tracking data. Thirteen participants were excluded because the experimenter was unable to 
accurately calibrate the eye-tracking apparatus to the participants‘ eyes.  
For each syllogism, gaze durations and transitions were summed for two areas of interest 
(AOI): Premises and Conclusion. Looking time to each AOI is depicted as a function of Premise 
Believability for Conditional Syllogisms and Categorical Syllogisms in Figure 27.  To explore 
how Premise Believability affected how participants viewed Conditional and Categorical 
syllogisms, the total of gaze durations was submitted to a 2 (Syllogism Type: Conditional, 
Categorical) x 2 (Premise Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 (AOI: Premises,  
Conclusion) repeated measures ANOVA. There was a significant interaction between Type and 
AOI, F(1,24) = 26.86, MSE = 1.285, p <.001, η
2 
= .528. This interaction was explored with 
paired-samples t-tests, which revealed that participants viewed premises significantly longer for 
conditional than for categorical syllogisms, t(24) = 5.07, p <.001, whereas there was no 
difference in conclusion gaze duration across Syllogism Type, t(24) = 1.49, p = .150. There was 
also a main effect of Premise Believability, F(1,24) = 21.32, MSE = 1.568, p <.001, η
2 











Figure 27. Total looking time to Premises and Conclusion a function of Premise Believability for 























































such that participants spent longer looking at syllogisms with unbelievable premises than those 
with believable premises. This main effect was qualified by an interaction between Premise 
Believability and AOI, F(1,24) = 11.52, MSE = 1.281, p <.01, η
2 
= .324, which indicates that the 
longer looking time to syllogisms with unbelievable premises over believable premises is more 
evident on premise looking time, t(24) = 4.23, p < .001, than on conclusion looking time, t(24) = 
2.68, p <.05.  
 Finally, there were main effects of Type, F(1,24) = 21.16, MSE = 2.467, p <.001, η
2 
= 
.469, and AOI, F(1,24) = 68.90, MSE = 11.967, p <.001, η
2 
= .742, on gaze duration. Not  
surprisingly, participants spent longer looking at the pair of premises than at the single 
conclusion, and spent longer looking at Conditional Syllogisms than Categorical Syllogisms.  
 Gaze Durations as a function of Pre- versus Post- Conclusion Fixation. Next, data was 
explored in a way that could examine differences in the temporal progression of reasoning about 
Conditional and Categorical Syllogisms. Gaze duration for premises was examined as a function 
of when it occurred: before or after the first fixation on the conclusion. Gaze duration on 
premises was divided into two values; the amount of time that participants spent fixated on the 
premises before and after conclusion fixation. Figure 28 depicts total premise looking time pre- 
and post- conclusion fixation as a function of Premise Believability for Conditional and  
Categorical Syllogisms. These values were submitted to a 2 (Type: Conditional, Categorical) x 2 
(Premise Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 (Order: Pre-Conclusion, Post-Conclusion) 
repeated measures ANOVA. There was a significant Type x Premise Believability x Order 
interaction, F(1,24) = 12.48, MSE = .714, p <.01, η
2 
= .362. Here, Premise Gaze Duration for 
Conditional and Categorical Syllogisms was submitted to two separate 2 (Premise Believability: 









Figure 28. Total looking time to Premises pre- and post-conclusion fixation as a function of 






















































ANOVAs. The interaction between Premise Believability and Order was marginally significant 
for Conditional Syllogisms, F(1,24) = 3.35, MSE = .556, p = .081, η
2 
= .132, and was significant 
for Categorical Syllogisms, F(1,24) = 7.87, MSE = 1.028, p = .010, η
2 
= .264. To explore these 
relations, paired-samples t-tests were carried out. For Conditional Syllogisms, Premise 
Believability affected Post-Conclusion looking time, t(24) = 2.64, p <.05, but not Pre-Conclusion 
looking time, t(24) = 1.25, p = .226. For Categorical Syllogisms, the converse was true: Premise 
Believability affected Pre-Conclusion looking time, t(24) = 6.32 p < .001, but not Post-
Conclusion looking time, t(24) = 0.26, p = .796. 
Gaze Transitions from Conclusion to Premises. To further explore premise processing 
after at least some reasoning had occurred, transitions from the conclusion to the premises were 
analyzed. Figures 29 and 30 depict average number of transitions from the conclusion to 
premises as a function of Conclusion Validity and Believability for Conditional Syllogisms with 
Believable and Unbelievable Premises, and Categorical Syllogisms with Believable and 
Unbelievable Premises, respectively. Frequencies of transitions from conclusions to premises 
were submitted to a 2 (Type: Valid, Invalid) x 2 (Premise Believability: Believable, 
Unbelievable) x 2 (Conclusion Validity: Valid, Invalid) x 2 (Conclusion Believability: 
Believable, Unbelievable) repeated measures ANOVA. There was a main effect of Type, F(1,24) 
= 41.99, MSE = .979, p <.001, η
2 
= .618, indicating that, overall, participants made more 
transitions from the conclusion to premises for Conditional than for Categorical Syllogisms.  
 There was a significant Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability interaction, F(1,24) = 4.65, MSE = .553, p <.05, η2 = .152. Two (Conclusion 
Validity: Valid, Invalid) x 2 (Conclusion Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) repeated 




Conditional Syllogisms with Believable Premises 
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Figure 29. Frequency of transitions from conclusion to premises as a function of Conclusion 


























































Categorical Syllogisms with Believable Premises 
 
 
Categorical Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises 
 
Figure 30. Frequency of transitions from conclusion to premises as a function of Conclusion 


























































Validity and Believability, F(1,24) = 9.09, MSE = 1.350, p <.01, η
2 
= .259, when premises were 
Believable, indicating that participants referred back to the premises more often for conflict 
problems than for non-conflict problems. This interaction was not significant, however, F(1,24) 
=0.07, MSE = 1.242, p = .792, η
2 
= .003 when premises were Unbelievable. 
 Given the hypothesis that there should be no effect of conclusion believability on gaze 
transition frequency for Categorical Syllogisms with Unbelievable Premises, transition data for 
Categorical Syllogisms were submitted to a 2 (Premise Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) 
x 2 (Conclusion Validity: Valid, Invalid) x 2 (Conclusion Believability: Believable, 
Unbelievable) repeated measures ANOVA. There was a marginally significant Premise 
Believability x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion Believability interaction, F(1,24) = 3.76, MSE 
= .716, p =.063, η
2 
= .126. For Believable Premises, there was a significant interaction between 
Conclusion Validity and Believability, F(1,24) = 4.55, MSE = .807, p <.05, η
2 
= .149. This 
interaction was not significant for Unbelievable Premises, F(1,24) = 0.35, MSE = .460, p =.558, 
η
2 
= .013. There was also no main effect of Conclusion Believability, F(1,24) = 2.06, MSE = 
.398, p =.162, η
2 
= .074.  
Memory Data 
 For each participant, the number of words recalled from each syllogism was tallied. The 
average number of words recalled for Categorical and Conditional Syllogisms is depicted in 
Figure 31 as a function of Premise Believability. Number of words recalled was submitted to a 2 
(Type: Conditional, Categorical) x 2 (Premise: Believable, Unbelievable) repeated measures 
ANOVA. Critically, there was a significant interaction between Syllogism Type and Premise 
Believability, F(1,36) = 9.68, MSE = .4.247, p <.01, η
2 
= .212. Paired-samples t-tests indicated 










Figure 31. Average number of words recalled from Conditional and Categorical Syllogisms as a 






































a function of premise believability, t(37) = 0.88, p = .384. However, for Categorical Syllogisms, 
participants had significantly better memory for content from syllogisms with Believable than 
Unbelievable Premises, t(37) = 6.58, p < .001.
2
 There was also a main effect of Premise 
Believability, F(1,36) = 20.64, MSE = 4.255, p <.001, η
2 
= .364, such that participants recalled 
more words from syllogisms with Believable than Unbelievable premises.  
Discussion 
 Eye-tracking results will be discussed first, followed by memory results.  
Eye-tracking 
 To test hypotheses regarding the time course of the reasoning process, eye movements 
were monitored while participants engaged in syllogistic reasoning. Although Experiments 1 
through 4 provided evidence that reasoning for categorical and conditional syllogisms differed, 
discrepancies in the time course of the reasoning process were yet unknown. The predictions 
offered by my proposed theory of premise evaluation were supported. First, premise believability 
affected premise looking duration before the conclusion was attended to for categorical 
syllogisms and after the conclusion was attended to for conditional syllogisms. This is strong 
evidence that the believability of categorical premises is evaluated prior to reasoning about the 
conclusion and that the believability of conditional premises is evaluated after conclusion 
reasoning. Note that even for categorical syllogisms, participants looked longer at unbelievable 
premises. This is in line with the theory of Spinoza and Gilbert (1991) that statements are 
                                                          
2
 There was concern that items in Categorical and Conditional syllogisms with Believable and Unbelievable 
Premises may be differentially memorable for reasons other than how they are treated during the reasoning 
process. To address this concern, Twenty-eight participants who did not participate in the reasoning portion 
of the experiment were recruited to serve as a control group. These participants were simply presented with 
the premises and conclusions from the syllogisms used in the reasoning task and asked to recall as many 
content words as possible. Critically, in the control group, the Type x Premise Believability interaction was 
not significant, F(1,27) = 1.82, MSE = 5.013, p =.188, η
2 
= .063, indicating that recall of believable and 
unbelievable statements was comparable across Categorical and Conditional Syllogisms. Thus, the 




automatically accepted and then discredited in a time-consuming process. This also corroborates 
experiments that suggest that unbelievable information takes longer to comprehend than 
believable information (Carpenter & Just, 1975). Thus, it may not be that reasoners do not 
automatically accept categorical statements, but that they simply ―disbelieve‖ unbelievable 
premises immediately, prior to reasoning about the conclusion.  
 Second, participants were more likely to transition back to the premises after looking at 
the conclusion for conditional than for categorical syllogisms. Again, this suggests that more 
premise processing happens after reasoning for conditional than for categorical premises. 
Further, there was evidence that for conditional syllogisms and categorical syllogisms with 
believable premises, participants referred back to the premises more often when conclusion 
validity conflicted with conclusion believability. However, this was not the case for categorical 
syllogisms with unbelievable premises. Yet again, there is evidence that conclusion believability 
does not play a role in reasoning about categorical syllogisms with unbelievable premises. 
Memory for Syllogisms 
 It was theorized that perhaps reasoners disregard content of categorical syllogisms with 
unbelievable premises. If so, then participants should have reduced memory for words from 
these syllogisms than from categorical syllogisms with believable premises and conditional 
syllogisms. This was indeed the case: Participants had poorer memory for words from 
categorical syllogisms with unbelievable premises than from the other three types of problems. 
This suggests that unbelievable categorical premises trigger participants to treat the syllogism as 
an abstract syllogism, thereby disregarding the content of the syllogism. Examining memory for 
syllogisms to elucidate mechanisms underlying reasoning—in particular, the depth with which 
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certain components of syllogisms are processed—is a novel approach. This experiment shows 





 The study of deductive reasoning has a rich history in both philosophy and psychology. 
Although phenomena associated with syllogistic reasoning, such as belief bias, have been studied 
for decades, there remain many unanswered questions concerning the mechanisms underlying 
the reasoning process. For example, the major theories of deductive reasoning (which account 
for the belief bias effect), including the Mental Models account (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) 
and Dual Process accounts (Evans, 2003, 2008), have not explicitly distinguished between 
mechanisms underlying categorical and conditional syllogistic reasoning. In fact, experiments 
designed to inform these theories use categorical syllogisms (e.g., Newstead et al., 1992; Klauer 
et al., 2000) and conditional syllogisms (Thompson, 1996; Torrens et al., 1999; Santamaria et al., 
1998) somewhat interchangeably. Given that similar belief bias effects are found for conditional 
and categorical syllogisms, it was not evident that theorizing different mechanisms was 
necessary. 
Recently, however, theorists are beginning to acknowledge that there may, in fact, be 
differences in how reasoners treat conditional and categorical syllogisms. For example, evidence 
now exists that different brain areas are activated during reasoning about categorical and 
conditional syllogisms (Reverberi et al., 2010), and that task demands, such as introducing time 
pressure, differentially influence conditional and categorical reasoning (Evans & Bacon, 2009). 
This dissertation adds to this growing body of evidence by assessing the degree to which 
manipulations of premise believably differentially influence reasoning with categorical and 
conditional syllogisms. Here, differential effects of premise believability are used as a tool to 
make inferences about mechanisms underlying reasoning with these two types of syllogisms. In 
 
103 
doing so, a theory was formulated that addresses how categorical and conditional premises are 
treated differently. 
Theory of Premise Evaluation 
 This theory postulates that categorical and conditional syllogisms differ in how and when 
premises are evaluated. Drawing on the work of Gilbert (1991; Gilbert et al., 1993; Gilbert et al., 
1990) which suggests that statements are automatically assumed to be true, it was theorized that 
conditional premises are assumed to be true regardless of their actual veracity. As such, the 
conclusion of conditional syllogisms is reasoned about under this assumption and, after 
reasoning has occurred, people may return to the premises and disbelieve them in a procedure 
that requires time. 
This theory is supported by the finding that the traditional belief bias effect occurs for 
conditional syllogisms with both believable and unbelievable premises; that is, reasoners do not 
seem to treat conclusions following these premises differently (Experiments 1-5). Further, 
reasoners take longer to reason about conditional syllogisms with unbelievable premises than 
with believable premises (Experiments 2-4), which is consistent with the postulation that it takes 
time to ―disbelieve‖ what was initially accepted as true. Eye-tracking data (Experiment 5) 
support the proposed time course of the reasoning process: Reasoners seem to accept conditional 
premises as true and then evaluate them after reasoning about the conclusion, as evidenced by 
effects of premise believability influencing post-conclusion looking time rather than pre-
conclusion looking time. Participants were also more likely to refer back to the premises after 
looking at the conclusion for conditional than for categorical syllogisms. With this post-
reasoning evaluation process comes a bias for participants to endorse more conclusions 
following from believable than unbelievable premises. 
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Although the exact mechanism through which this post-reasoning evaluation process 
occurs is not fully known, there is other evidence in the literature that has shown that reasoners 
are less likely to draw or endorse conclusions following from false or unsound premises than 
from true or sound premises (Simoneau & Markovits, 2003; George, 1995, 1997, 1999). For 
example, George (1995) found that reasoners were less certain that a conclusion was valid when 
they were also uncertain that premises were true. Thus, realizing that premises are unbelievable 
may reduce reasoners‘ confidence in their valid response, leading them to judge that a conclusion 
is invalid. Asking participants to rate their confidence in their validity judgements (cf. Shynkaruk 
& Thompson, 2006) would likely reveal lower confidence for conclusions following from 
unbelievable premises.  
Finally, Experiment 4 indicates that it is the word ‗if‘ in conditional premises that causes 
reasoners to assume that premises are true. This small word has a rich meaning: It invites 
reasoners to assume, or imagine, that what follows is true or possible (Evans & Over, 2004). 
Thus, instructions for conditional syllogisms may not need to specify that participants need to 
assume that premises are true, as is the standard; these instructions are likely redundant because 
the truth assumption appears to be the default.  
 The data for categorical syllogisms support a different theory of premise evaluation. It is 
theorized that reasoners evaluate the believability of categorical premises immediately upon 
reading them, prior to reasoning about the conclusion. If premises are true, then all information 
in the syllogism is taken into account. However, if premises are false, then the content in the 
problem is ignored or not processed as deeply. Experiments 1 through 5 indicate that belief bias 
is suppressed when premises are unbelievable; that is, conclusion believability does not affect 
conclusion endorsement. The absence of the belief bias effect is striking, given that this 
 
105 
phenomenon has repeatedly been shown to be extremely robust. Response latency evidence 
(Experiment 2-4) also indicates that conclusion believability does not affect reasoning time and 
does not interfere with responding when conclusion believability conflicts with validity. Perhaps 
the most compelling evidence for this theory comes from Experiment 5, which demonstrated that 
participants had significantly poorer memory for words from categorical syllogisms with 
unbelievable premises relative to other syllogisms. This finding supports the theory proposed 
here and the notion alluded to by Cherubini et al. (1998): Reasoners disregard the content of 
categorical syllogisms with unbelievable premises.  
Mechanisms Underlying the Differential Role of Premise Belief 
The specific mechanisms through which this disregarding occurs is not fully known. One 
possibility is that reasoners simply do not fully encode the content when they are reasoning with 
syllogisms because they abstract the logical form from the problem; another possibility is that 
reasoners may actively inhibit the content in the syllogism. There is some evidence for both of 
these possibilities. Markovits and Lortie-Forgues (in press) report that children who are more 
accurate at conditional reasoning with unbelievable premises are also more accurate at abstract 
conditional reasoning, suggesting that the ability to abstract the form from syllogisms may 
benefit reasoning. Markovits and colleagues (Markovits et al., 2009) also present evidence that 
inhibition is at work. They presented participants with problems with a major conditional 
premise and minor categorical premise and asked them to generate conclusions that followed 
from these premises. They report a curious finding: When the major premise was undeniably 
false, reasoners were more likely to draw valid, yet unbelievable, conclusions than when the 
major premise was plausible. They interpret these findings to suggest that, under instructions to 
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assume that premises are true, reasoners inhibit information presented in false premises. Because 
these concepts are inhibited, reasoners find it easier to draw unbelievable conclusions.  
Although inhibition may be necessary under some circumstances, the results of 
Markovits et al. (2009) do not necessarily transfer to categorical syllogisms with unbelievable 
premises. First, they used problems with a one major conditional premise and a minor premise 
(e.g., If p, then q; p; therefore q). Although the same mechanisms may underlie reasoning of this 
form and syllogistic reasoning, there is not yet evidence that this is the case. Second, they claim 
that it is the instruction to assume that premises are true which elicits inhibition of false 
information; the experiments presented here demonstrate that reasoners do not take the 
believability of conclusions following from categorical, unbelievable premises into account even 
in the absence of this instruction. It seems, then, that there is something about the unbelievable 
categorical statement itself that leads reasoners to disregard information in the syllogisms in 
which they are embedded. Regardless of the mechanism, it is clear that reasoners identify 
unbelievable premises early on in the reasoning process, which then trigger reasoners not to 
utilize the content of the problem when reasoning.  
 It is worth noting here that although reasoners do not use the believability of the 
conclusion to inform their judgment about the validity of the conclusion, they are not necessarily 
more accurate. That is, they do not compensate for this by using only the validity of the 
conclusion in their judgment. This is to be expected if reasoners abstract the logical form from 
the syllogism and then attempt to reason abstractly: Previous work has shown that abstract 
reasoning is quite difficult (Markovits & Vachon, 1990).  Moreover, it is also possible that, in 




Implications for Reasoning Theories 
 Mental Models theory. The experiments presented here have implications for both 
reasoning theories and theories of information comprehension. First, the data can speak to the 
two most influential theories of deductive reasoning: the Mental Models account (Johnson-Laird 
& Byrne, 1991) and Dual Process accounts. The Mental Models account specifies that the 
reasoning process starts with a model of the premises, and then the conclusion is tested against 
this initial model. If the conclusion is believable, reasoners are less likely to search for alternate 
models that invalidate the conclusion than if the conclusion is unbelievable. This theory makes 
specific predictions about response latencies that have been fully explored elsewhere (Thompson 
et al., 2003; Ball et al., 2006). Briefly, because reasoners are thought to search for counter 
models only when conclusions are unbelievable, unbelievable conclusion should elicit longer 
response latencies than believable conclusions. In general, the response latency data reported 
here (along with those of Thompson et al. and Ball et al.), in which participants generally spend 
longer on problems where the validity and believability of the conclusion conflict, do not support 
a Mental Models account of reasoning.  
More relevant to the current thesis, however, is what can be said about how premises are 
modelled. Critical assumptions of the Mental Models account of reasoning are the principle of 
truth, which states that, reasoners ―construct mental models that represent explicitly only what is 
true, and not what is false‖ (Johnson-Laird, 1999, p. 8), and the related principle of semantic 
modulation of conditionals, which asserts that, ―the meanings of the antecedent and consequent, 
and coreferential links between these two clauses, can add information to models, prevent the 
construction of otherwise feasible models of the core meaning, and aid the process of 
constructing fully explicit models‖ (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p. 13). Thus, Johnson-Laird 
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and colleagues claim that meaning modulates the representation of premises, and that models 
elicited by false premises are blocked (Johnson-Laird, 2001). 
Contrary to these assumptions is Evans and Overs‘ (2004) suppositional theory, of which 
they state, ―our view of ‗if‘ is that of a linguistic device, the purpose of which is to trigger a 
process of hypothetical thinking and reasoning‖ (p. 153). Evans and Over assert that ‗if’ invites 
reasoners to assume that the content of the conditional premise is true. More specifically, the 
suppositional theory maintains that reasoners assume that the antecedent of the conditional 
statement is true, and then judge the probability of the consequent given the antecedent. 
Individuals do this by taking into account context and the meaning of the conditional. Thus, 
Evans and Over ascribe unique value to the meaning of the word ‗if’, but do not assert that it 
elicits total acceptance of following statement.   
 The current experiments provide some evidence that can speak to these principles. In 
typical experiments of deductive reasoning, participants are instructed to assume that premises 
are true, although four of the five experiments presented here did not include this instruction. In 
these experiments, belief bias was not found for categorical syllogisms with unbelievable 
premises, and it is postulated that for these syllogisms, participants extracted the abstract logical 
form (i.e., stripped the content from the problem). Belief bias resulted for all conditional 
syllogisms, and it is posited here that the believability of premises acts post-reasoning, with 
participants having a bias to accept conclusions following from believable premises. 
It is conceivable, then, that the proposals of Evans and Over (2004) and of Johnson-Laird 
(2001; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) are both correct, albeit in different circumstances. In 
partial accordance with Evans and Over, conditional syllogisms have a built-in instruction of 
sorts to assume that premises are true: the word ‗if,‘ although it is proposed here that ‗if‘ is even 
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more powerful than Evans and Over assert and causes the reasoner to temporarily assume that 
both the antecedent and consequent are true. Indeed, these experiments yield evidence that both 
believable and unbelievable premises were successfully modelled when reasoning with 
conditional syllogisms, as similar belief bias effects resulted regardless of premise believability. 
For categorical syllogisms on the other hand, which lack this invitation to think hypothetically, 
reasoners behaved as if they represented unbelievable premises abstractly. Thus, it seems as 
though participants were only able to reason about meaningful premises when they were true or 
were assumed to be true (as encouraged through instruction or through the word ‗if‘). The data 
from these experiments also uphold this principle of truth – it seems as though we do not 
mentally model information that we know to be false.  
The Mental Models account places great emphasis on conclusion believability, asserting 
that conclusion believability either encourages or inhibits modelling of the premises. However, 
the data presented here suggest that the reverse relation may also be true: Premise believability 
may determine how one reasons about the conclusion. Specifically, when premises are false, a 
model is created with abstract information, which may in turn lead reasoners to abstract the 
conclusion. In a sense, reasoners are less biased about the conclusion when reasoning about 
false, categorical, information. Given that reasoning about the premises themselves is the first 
step in the Mental Models account, it appears that greater attention should be paid to how the 
content of the premises influences later reasoning about the conclusion.  
 Dual Process theories. Dual Process accounts of reasoning have also been extremely 
influential and controversial. As reviewed previously, Dual Process accounts differ on specifics, 
but most agree that there are two systems that influence reasoning: System 1 is thought to be 
automatic, quick, resource-independent, and to respond according to heuristics or surface 
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features of stimuli; whereas System 2 is thought to be resource-dependent, slow, and to respond 
according to logical analysis of stimuli. Dual Process theories differ in how they delineate the 
relations between these two systems. Default-interventionist models (Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002, 2005; Evans, 2006) propose that the response provided by System 1 is always the default 
response and that, given enough time and resources, System 2 can subsequently override this 
default response. Parallel-Process theories (e.g., Sloman, 1996) posit that both systems are 
activated together and operate in parallel, and that the response output will depend on 
motivation, external factors, and resources. All Dual Process theories posit that System 1 
provides a response based on the believability of the conclusion, whereas System 2 provides a 
response based on the validity of the conclusion. 
Overall, the response latency data from the present experiments support general Dual 
Process accounts, which predict that when the validity and believability of the conclusion 
conflicts, reasoners will need to spend some time resolving this conflict. For most syllogisms, 
participants spent longer reasoning about conclusions in which the validity and believability of 
the conclusion conflicted, suggesting that there was some need to resolve conflicting responses. 
Interestingly, however, categorical syllogisms with unbelievable premises did not demonstrate 
this pattern. For these syllogisms, there is no evidence in response latencies, conclusion 
endorsement patterns, or eye-tracking data of a conflict between two different systems. In fact, 
there is only evidence that conclusion validity factored into responding, which is thought to be 
the responsibility of System 2. 
 This poses a problem for both Default-Interventionist models and Parallel Process 
models. Both of these accounts state that System 1 provides an automatic response; as Evans and 
Over (2004) state, ―people will sometimes rely on System 1 processes and sometimes much 
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more on System 2 processes (although we hold that the latter processes must always depend on 
the former to some extent)‖ (p.24). However, there is no evidence of System 1 involvement for 
categorical syllogisms with unbelievable premises. It is possible that System 2 always overrode 
the response provided by System 1, however, this is unlikely given that this is thought to require 
time, and participants did not spend longer overall on these syllogisms. Rather, it seems as 
though the unbelievable premises (when participants were not encouraged to assume their truth 
via instruction or ‗if‘) pre-empted activation of System 1, perhaps because the unbelievable 
information in categorical syllogisms triggered reasoners to assume that responses provided by 
System 1, that is, responses based on conclusion believability, would likely be inaccurate. This 
compelling finding suggests that System 1 may not be automatic at all, and that factors such as 
context and the task at hand may influence whether System 1 gets activated. Therefore, whether 
this activation is under volitional control is a question that should be addressed in future 
research. 
Implications for Theories of Information Comprehension 
 The theory of Spinoza, championed by Gilbert (1991), that to comprehend a statement we 
must automatically assume that it is true, was used to inform my proposed theory of premise 
evaluation. Given the data here, what can be said about this theory? The way information is 
framed seems to influence how people proceed with it, as has been shown in other situations. 
Specifically, people seem to readily assume that conditional statements are true, and to suspend 
judgment about the veracity of conditional statements until after the information has been used to 
reason about a conclusion. On the other hand, people either do not automatically assume that 
categorical premises are true, or assume that they are true and then immediately disbelieve false 
statements unless instructed to do otherwise. Support for the latter hypothesis can be drawn from 
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the eye-tracking results of Experiment 5, which show that, prior to looking at the conclusion, 
participants spent longer looking at unbelievable categorical premises than at believable 
categorical premises, consistent with the hypothesis that it takes time to disbelieve false 
information (Gilbert, 1991; Just & Carpenter, 1976). Regardless, the data clearly reveal that 
conditional and categorical statements are treated differently. Crucially, conditional statements 
are assumed to be true until at least some reasoning about the conclusion has taken place whereas 
categorical statements are evaluated prior to reasoning about the conclusion.  
 Aligning the above discussion of the Mental Model account‘s principle of truth with 
Gilbert and Spinoza‘s ideas, there is even more evidence that one must believe something to be 
true in order to understand it. Johnson-Laird (1999, 2001) postulates that we do not model what 
is not true, and Gilbert and colleagues (1990) go even further, stating that ―the mental 
representation of a proposition or idea always has a truth value associated with it, and by default 
this value is true” (p. 2). Thus, Gilbert would maintain that it is impossible to represent what is 
not true. The data in this thesis support this idea: When participants were not encouraged to 
assume that premises were true (either via instruction or with the word ‗if‘), they could not 
represent premises without presumably abstracting the form, as evidenced by their poor memory 
for the content of categorical syllogisms with unbelievable premises.  
Conclusion 
 The study of deductive reasoning has a rich history which, curiously, has for the most 
part overlooked the role of premises in a syllogism in favour of the conclusion. This thesis 
demonstrates that varying the believability of the premises not only yields valuable insights 
about mechanisms underlying reasoning in general, but also brings to light a key difference 
between categorical and conditional syllogisms. Specifically, premises in these two types of 
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syllogisms are treated differently; in turn, this influences how the conclusion is judged. For 
conditional syllogisms, premises, preceded by ‗if,‘ are presumed to be true until at least some 
reasoning about the conclusion has been carried out. On the other hand, categorical premises 
encourage reasoners to evaluate their believability immediately. If the premises are judged false, 
then reasoners are in a sense less biased, as they disregard believability information in the rest of 
the syllogism.  
Taken together, the data contained in this thesis add to a small but growing body of 
literature that is delineating key differences underlying categorical and conditional reasoning. 
Any comprehensive reasoning theory must account for independent mechanisms underlying the 
reasoning process for conditional and categorical syllogisms, rather than treating them similarly, 
as is the current trend. More generally, this thesis corroborates theories of belief bias and 
indicates that the knowledge and beliefs held by an individual can greatly influence how they 
reason about information. The theory that I propose suggests that this knowledge not only 
influences how individuals draw conclusions from information, but how their beliefs about the 
information itself interact with the format in which the information is presented (i.e., 
conditionally or categorically, to influence reasoning). Specifically, the data presented here 
suggests that information presented in a hypothetical manner will be accepted for the duration of 
the reasoning process, whereas information presented in a factual manner will be critically 
evaluated immediately. Further, individuals are less likely to be biased when reasoning about 
false information presented in a factual manner than when reasoning about information that can 
be interpreted as hypothetical.  
Returning to the example from the introduction, a doctor who wants her patient to be less 
influenced by his beliefs about the uses of aspirin for headaches would be wise to instruct him, 
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―people on this medication cannot take aspirin,‖ as opposed to ―if you take this medication, then 
do not take aspirin.‖ Here, even if the patient does not believe the doctor‘s orders, he would be 
less likely to take his beliefs about what is appropriate given a headache into account when 
drawing a conclusion about whether he is allowed to take aspirin or not. Conversely, advertisers 
promoting flimsy claims should tell consumers, ―If you use our product, you will be happy,‖ 
rather than ―people who use our product are happy.‖ Consumers are likely to accept the former 
claim as they reason about whether they should buy the product or not, whereas consumers are 
likely to immediately evaluate—and reject—the latter claim. Thus, both the content and the 
format of statements influence how individuals reason about them. Further study of variables that 
may independently influence reasoning with conditional and categorical syllogisms will surely 
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Experiment 1 Stimuli and Pilot Ratings 
 
Note: For the pilot test of the stimuli, 40 participants completed an online measure in which they 
rated the believability of each statement on a scale from 1 (Very Unbelievable) to 5 (Very 
Believable). 
 
A) Categorical Syllogisms 
  














Unbelievable Conclusion Belief 
Rating 
Valid No dogs are felines 
Some furry animals are felines 
Therefore, some furry animals are 
not dogs 
 
No actresses are men 
Some singers are men 











No puppies are cobras 
Some snakes are cobras 
Therefore, some snakes are not 
puppies 
 
No birds are salmon 
Some fish are salmon 










Invalid No teenagers are elderly 
Some males are elderly 
Therefore, some teenagers are not 
males 
 
No grandparents are children 
Some females are children 










No cod are angelfish 
Some fish are angelfish 
Therefore, some cod are not fish 
 
 
No roses are weeds 
Some plants are weeds 




































Unbelievable Conclusion Belief 
Rating 
Valid No black animals are rodents 
Some cats are rodents 
Therefore, some cats are not 
black animals 
 
No poisonous animals are insects 
Some snakes are insects 











No animals are dogs 
Some lions are dogs 
Therefore, some lions are not 
animals 
 
No flowers are daisies 
Some daffodils are daisies 
Therefore, some daffodils are 









Invalid No books are novels 
Some magazines are novels 
Therefore, some books are not 
magazines 
 
No vehicles are buses 
Some convertibles are buses 










No butterflies are insects 
Some rabbits are insects 
Therefore, some butterflies are 
not rabbits 
 
No monkeys are primates 
Some alligators are primates 













B) Conditional Syllogisms  
 












Unbelievable Conclusion Belief 
Rating 
Valid If an animal is a bird, then it has a 
beak 
If an animal has a beak, then it 
has feathers 
Therefore, if an animal is a bird, 
then it has feathers 
 
 
If an animal is a tiger, then it eats 
meat 
If an animal eats meat, then it is a 
carnivore 
Therefore, if an animal is a tiger, 














If a vehicle is a motorcycle, then 
it has wheels 
If a vehicle has wheels, then it 
has a steering wheel 
Therefore, if a vehicle is a 
motorcycle, then it has a 
steering wheel 
 
If an animal is a whale, then it is 
a mammal 
If an animal is a mammal, then 
it is a land-dweller 
Therefore, if an animal is a 















Invalid If an animal is a feline, then it 
purrs 
If an animal purrs, then it is a cat 
Therefore, if an animal is a cat, 
then it is a feline 
 
 
If an animal is an amphibian, then 
it croaks 
If an animal croaks, then it is a 
frog 
Therefore, if an animal is a frog, 














If an object is a grape, then it is 
a fruit 
If an object is a fruit, then it is a 
food 
Therefore, if an object is a food, 
then it is a grape 
 
If an object is an iPod, then it is 
a music player 
If an object is a music player, 
then it is electronic 
Therefore, if an object is 



























Unbelievable Conclusion Belief 
Rating 
Valid If a person is a pianist, then he is 
a professor 
If a person is a professor, then he 
is a musician 
Therefore, if a person is a pianist, 
then he is a musician 
 
If an animal is a puppy, then it is 
cold-blooded 
If an animal is cold-blooded, then 
it is a canine 
Therefore, if an animal is a 













If a person is a father, then they 
are a doctor 
If a person is a doctor, then they 
are a woman 
Therefore, if a person is a father, 
then they are a woman 
 
If an animal is a flamingo, then 
it is a cat 
If an animal is a cat, then it is a 
reptile 
Therefore, if an animal is a 














Invalid If a food is candy, then it is meat 
If a food is meat, then it is a 
lollipop 
Therefore, if a food is a lollipop, 
then it is candy 
 
 
If an animal is cold-blooded, then 
it is a squirrel 
If an animal is a squirrel, then it 
is a reptile 
Therefore, if an animal is a 













If a plant is a weed, then it is an 
oak tree 
If a plant is an oak tree, then it is 
a flower 
Therefore, if a plant is a flower, 
then it is a weed 
 
If a food is a cookie, then it is a 
vegetable 
If a food is a vegetable, then it is 
a bean 
Therefore, if a food is a bean, 



















Experiments 2-5 Stimuli and Pilot Ratings 
 
Note: For the pilot test of the stimuli, 20 participants completed an online measure in which they 
rated the believability of each statement on a scale from 1 (Very Unbelievable) to 5 (Very 
Believable). 
 
A) Categorical Syllogisms  
 















Unbelievable Conclusion Belief 
Rating 
Valid All slacks are pants 
All pants are clothing 
Therefore, all slacks are clothing 
 
No dogs are felines 
Some furry animals are felines 










All rats are pests 
All pests are insects 
Therefore, All rats are insects  
 
No puppies are cobras 
Some snakes are cobras 










Invalid All infants are newborns 
All newborns are babies 
Therefore, all babies are infants  
 
 
No grandparents are children 
Some females are children 










All toddlers are children 
All children are humans 
Therefore, all humans are 
toddlers  
 
No cod are angelfish 
Some fish are angelfish 














































All reptiles are rabbits 
All rabbits are cold-blooded 
Therefore, all reptiles are cold-
blooded 
 
No black animals are rodents 
Some cats are rodents 















All cherries are tools 
All tools are wooden things 
Therefore, all cherries are 
wooden things 
 
No flowers are daisies 
Some daffodils are daisies 



















All copper things are toys 
All toys are pennies 




No vehicles are buses 
Some convertibles are buses 












All diamonds are inexpensive 
All inexpensive things are 
gemstones 
Therefore, all gemstones are 
diamonds  
 
No monkeys are primates 
Some alligators are primates 














B) Conditional Syllogisms 
  
























If an animal is a bird, then it has a 
beak 
If an animal has a beak, then it 
has feathers 
Therefore, if an animal is a bird, 
then it has feathers 
 
 
If a room is dirty, then it is not 
clean 
If a room is not clean, then it is 
messy 
Therefore, if a room is dirty, then 














If a vehicle is a motorcycle, then 
it has wheels 
If a vehicle has wheels, then it 
has a steering wheel 
Therefore, if a vehicle is a 
motorcycle, then it has a 
steering wheel 
 
If a person is an employee, then 
she is not retired 
If a person is not retired, then 
she is young 
Therefore, if a person is an 























If an animal is an amphibian, then 
it croaks 
If an animal croaks, then it is a 
frog 
Therefore, if an animal is a frog, 
then it is an amphibian 
 
If a person is a girl, then they are 
not a son 
If a person is not a son, then they 
are a daughter 
Therefore, if a person is a 














If an object is a grape, then it is 
a fruit 
If an object is a fruit, then it is a 
food 
Therefore, if an object is a food, 
then it is a grape 
 
If it is sunny, then it is not night 
If it is not night, then it is day 















b. Unbelievable Premises 
 














If a person is a pianist, then he is 
a professor 
If a person is a professor, then he 
is a musician 
Therefore, if a person is a pianist, 
then he is a musician 
 
If a food is a chilli pepper, then it 
is not a vegetable 
If a food is not a vegetable, then 
it is spicy 
Therefore, if a food is a chilli 













If a person is a father, then they 
are a doctor 
If a person is a doctor, then they 
are a woman 
Therefore, if a person is a father, 
then they are a woman 
 
If an object is a musical 
instrument, then it is not a piano 
If an object is not a piano, then it 
is not an accordion 
Therefore, if an object is a 






















If a food is candy, then it is meat 
If a food is meat, then it is a 
lollipop 
Therefore, if a food is a lollipop, 
then it is candy 
 
If an animal swims, then it is not 
a fish 
If an animal is not a fish, then it 
is a dolphin 
Therefore, if an animal is a 

















If a food is a cookie, then it is a 
vegetable 
If a food is a vegetable, then it is 
a bean 
Therefore, if a food is a bean, 
then it is a cookie 
 
If a person  is not a hockey 
player, then he is rich 
If a person is not rich, then he is 
an athlete 
Therefore, if a person is an 


















Complete Overall ANOVA Results 
 
Note: Results in bold were presented in the main text.  
 
A. Experiment 1 
 
a. Conclusion Endorsement Results 
 
Variable(s) DF F MSE p η
2
 
Type 1, 68 0.02 .787 .892 <.001 
Premise Believability 1, 68 0.11 .521 .740 .002 
Conclusion Validity 1, 68 79.36 .862 <.001 .575 
Conclusion Believability 1, 68 48.44 .515 <.001 .416 
Type x Premise Believability 1, 68 2.13 .435 .149 .030 
Type x Conclusion Validity 1, 68 0.45 .511 .503 .007 
Type x Conclusion Believability 1, 68 6.23 .364 <.05 .084 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 1, 68 2.37 .391 .128 .034 
Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 68 6.49 .295 <.05 .087 
Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 68 9.95 .368 <.01 .136 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity 
1, 68 0.47 .497 .497 .007 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 68 3.84 .341 .054 .053 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 68 0.63 .284 .432 .009 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 
x Conclusion Believability 
1, 68 0.01 .323 .916 <.001 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Conclusion Believability 





B. Experiment 2 
 
a. Conclusion Endorsement Results 
 
Variable(s) DF F MSE p η
2
 
Type 1, 39 2.81 .160 .101 .067 
Models  1, 39 0.06 .200 .804 .002 
Premise Believability 1, 39 4.80 .407 <.05 .110 
Conclusion Validity 1, 39 37.23 .498 <.001 .488 
Conclusion Believability 1, 39 54.39 .341 <.001 .582 
Type x Models 1, 39 1.88 .167 .179 .046 
Type x Premise Believability 1, 39 19.02 .066 <.001 .328 
Type x Conclusion Validity 1, 39 2.83 .217 .101 .068 
Type x Conclusion Believability 1, 39 0.23 .192 .134 .057 
Models x Premises Believability 1, 39 0.36 .138 .551 .009 
Models x Conclusion Validity 1, 39 5.21 .117 <.05 .118 
Models x Conclusion Believability 1, 39 8.15 .203 <.01 .173 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 1, 39 2.17 .117 .149 .053 
Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 39 48.30 .131 <.001 .553 
Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 39 1.57 .162 .218 .039 
Type x Models x Premise Believability 1, 39 0.70 .112 .408 .018 
Type x Models x Conclusion Validity 1, 39 0.63 .125 .433 .016 
Type x Models x Conclusion Believability 1, 39 1.78 .143 .190 .044 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity 
1, 39 1.99 .157 .166 .049 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 39 24.25 .167 <.001 .383 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 39 6.55 .122 <.05 .144 
Models x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity 
1, 39 1.06 .189 .310 .026 
Models x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 39 1.49 .134 .230 .037 
Models x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 39 3.52 .128 .068 .083 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 
x Conclusion Believability 
1, 39 0.60 .131 .445 .015 
Type x Models x Premise Believability x 
Conclusion Validity 
1, 39 10.68 .155 <.05 .215 
Type x Models x Premise Believability x 
Conclusion Believability 
 
1, 39 1.35 .113 .252 .034 




Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Conclusion Believability 
1, 39 2.71 .166 .108 .065 
Models x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Conclusion Believability 
1, 39 2.03 .154 .162 .050 
Type x Models x Premise Believability x 
Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 39 0.03 .091 .854 .001 
 
b. Response Latency Results 
 
Variable(s) DF F MSE p η
2
 
Type 1, 39 31.87 1.103 x 10
8
 <.001 .450 
Models  1, 39 8.99 7.109 x 10
7
 .005 .187 
Premise Believability 1, 39 27.88 8.254 x 10
7
 <.001 .417 
Conclusion Validity 1, 39 6.01 1.806 x 10
8
 <.05 .134 
Conclusion Believability 1, 39 0.17 8.398 x 10
7
 .684 .004 
Type x Models 1, 39 23.84 6.777 x 10
7
 <.001 .379 
Type x Premise Believability 1, 39 5.66 1.334 x 10
8
 <.05 .127 
Type x Conclusion Validity 1, 39 15.06 5.244 x 10
7
 <.001 .279 
Type x Conclusion Believability 1, 39 0.64 8.436 x 10
7
 .430 .016 
Models x Premises Believability 1, 39 0.06 1.703 x 10
7
 .812 .001 
Models x Conclusion Validity 1, 39 1.45 5.307 x 10
7
 .235 .036 
Models x Conclusion Believability 1, 39 2.19 8.207 x 10
7
 .147 .053 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 1, 39 7.25 1.030 x 10
8
 .01 .157 
Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 39 4.72 4.873 x 10
7
 <.05 .108 
Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 39 10.10 9.438 x 10
7
 <.01 .206 
Type x Models x Premise Believability 1, 39 0.27 6.160 x 10
7
 .602 .007 
Type x Models x Conclusion Validity 1, 39 0.12 8.262 x 10
7
 .734 .003 
Type x Models x Conclusion Believability 1, 39 3.11 1.242 x 10
8
 .086 .074 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity 
1, 39 0.51 4.371 x 10
7
 .479 .013 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 39 0.77 6.318 x 10
7
 .385 .019 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 39 4.66 8.753 x 10
7
 <.05 .107 
Models x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity 
1, 39 0.31 4.599 x 10
7
 .579 .008 
Models x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 39 4.57 1.061 x 10
8
 <.05 .105 
Models x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 39 1.87 6.853 x 10
7
 .179 .046 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 1, 39 7.96 5.201 x 10
8
 <.01 .169 
 
133 
x Conclusion Believability 
Type x Models x Premise Believability x 
Conclusion Validity 
1, 39 5.98 7.852 x 10
7
 <.05 .133 
Type x Models x Premise Believability x 
Conclusion Believability 
1, 39 6.34 8.629 x 10
7
 <.05 .140 
Type x Models x Conclusion Validity x 
Conclusion Believability 
1, 39 1.83 8.590 x 10
7
 .162 .049 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Conclusion Believability 
1, 39 12.09 1.103 x 10
8
 .001 .237 
Models x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Conclusion Believability 
1, 39 1.35 1.098 x 10
8
 .252 .033 
Type x Models x Premise Believability x 
Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 39 0.07 1.019 x 10
8






C. Experiment 3 
 
a. Conclusion Endorsement Results 
 
Variable(s) DF F MSE p η
2
 
Type 1, 83 21.80 .444 <.001 .208 
Type x Condition 1, 83 1.93 .444 .168 .023 
Premise Believability 1, 83 15.75 .264 <.001 .160 
Premise Believability x Condition 1, 83 0.08 .264 .775 .001 
Conclusion Validity 1, 83 102.15 1.11 <.001 .552 
Conclusion Validity x Condition 1, 83 0.13 1.11 .717 .002 
Conclusion Believability 1, 83 74.84 .814 <.001 .474 
Conclusion Believability x Condition 1, 83 0.13 .814 .719 .002 
Type x Premise Believability 1, 83 19.40 .273 <.001 .189 
Type x Premise Believability x Condition 1, 83 3.10 .273 .082 .036 
Type x Conclusion Validity 1, 83 1.43 .391 .235 .017 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Condition 1, 83 0.21 .391 .647 .003 
Type x Conclusion Believability 1, 83 0.50 .342 .500 .006 
Type x Conclusion Believability x Condition 1, 83 1.66 .342 .201 .020 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 1, 83 1.43 .257 .235 .017 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 
x Condition 
1, 83 0.27 .257 .607 .003 
Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 83 7.05 .312 <.01 .078 
Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability x Condition 
1, 83 9.69 .312 <.01 .105 
Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 83 11.68 .351 .001 .123 
Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability x Condition 
1, 83 .014 .351 .906 <.001 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity 
1, 83 0.47 .403 .495 .006 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Condition 
1, 83 0.47 .403 .495 .006 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 83 21.43 .260 <.001 .205 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability x Condition 
1, 83 3.68 .260 .058 .043 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 83 0.20 .334 .659 .002 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability x Condition 
1, 83 0.12 .334 .724 .002 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 
x Conclusion Believability 
1, 83 0.64 .215 .426 .008 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 1, 83 0.48 .215 .493 .006 
 
135 
x Conclusion Believability x Condition 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Conclusion Believability 
1, 83 0.03 .290 .859 <.001 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Conclusion Believability x 
Condition 
1, 83 1.551 .290 .216 .018 
 
b. Response Latency Results 
 
Variable(s) DF F MSE p η
2
 
Type 1, 83 37.03 3.049 x 10
8
 <.001 .309 
Type x Condition 1, 83 0.49 3.049 x 10
8
 .486 .006 
Premise Believability 1, 83 19.86 1.607 x 10
8
 <.001 .193 
Premise Believability x Condition 1, 83 3.49 1.607 x 10
8
 .065 .040 
Conclusion Validity 1, 83 16.52 2.454 x 10
8
 <.001 .166 
Conclusion Validity x Condition 1, 83 2.93 2.454 x 10
8
 .091 .034 
Conclusion Believability 1, 83 1.05 1.857 x 10
8
 .309 .012 
Conclusion Believability x Condition 1, 83 0.05 1.857 x 10
8
 .827 .001 
Type x Premise Believability 1, 83 8.09 1.453 x 10
8
 <.01 .089 
Type x Premise Believability x Condition 1, 83 0.22 1.453 x 10
8
 .642 .003 
Type x Conclusion Validity 1, 83 8.94 1.499 x 10
8
 <.01 .097 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Condition 1, 83 1.37 1.499 x 10
8
 .245 .016 
Type x Conclusion Believability 1, 83 2.22 1.773 x 10
8
 .140 .026 
Type x Conclusion Believability x Condition 1, 83 0.35 1.773 x 10
8
 .558 .004 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 1, 83 8.72 1.300 x 10
8
 <.01 .095 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 
x Condition 
1, 83 1.26 1.300 x 10
8
 .264 .015 
Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 83 1.33 1.897 x 10
8
 .252 .016 
Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability x Condition 
1, 83 0.18 1.897 x 10
8
 .673 .002 
Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 83 3.94 1.408 x 10
8
 .05 .045 
Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability x Condition 
1, 83 0.24 1.408 x 10
8
 .626 .003 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity 
1, 83 0.27 1.362 x 10
8
 .602 .003 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Condition 
1, 83 3.24 1.362 x 10
8
 .075 .038 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 83 3.10 1.184 x 10
8




Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability x Condition 
1, 83 0.72 1.184 x 10
8
 .398 .009 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 83 2.61 1.147 x 10
8
 .110 .031 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability x Condition 
1, 83 0.22 1.147 x 10
8
 .643 .003 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 
x Conclusion Believability 
1, 83 1.97 1.712 x 10
8
 .165 .023 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 
x Conclusion Believability x Condition 
1, 83 0.01 1.712 x 10
8
 .945 <.001 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Conclusion Believability 
1, 83 9.41 1.128 x 10
8
 <.01 .102 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Conclusion Believability x 
Condition 
1, 83 0.96 1.128 x 10
8





D. Experiment 4 
 
a. Conclusion Endorsement Results 
 
Variable(s) DF F MSE p η
2
 
Type 1, 88 0.66 .424 .418 .007 
Type x Condition 1, 88 0.01 .424 .928 <.001 
Premise Believability 1, 88 0.84 .395 .361 .010 
Premise Believability x Condition 1, 88 0.54 .395 .467 .006 
Conclusion Validity 1, 88 109.87 .591 <.001 .555 
Conclusion Validity x Condition 1, 88 1.66 .591 .201 .018 
Conclusion Believability 1, 88 110.02 1.104 <.001 .556 
Conclusion Believability x Condition 1, 88 0.38 1.104 .539 .004 
Type x Premise Believability 1, 88 13.94 .261 <.001 .137 
Type x Premise Believability x Condition 1, 88 0.26 .261 .613 .003 
Type x Conclusion Validity 1, 88 2.43 .394 .123 .027 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Condition 1, 88 1.58 .394 .212 .018 
Type x Conclusion Believability 1, 88 0.44 .487 .439 .007 
Type x Conclusion Believability x Condition 1, 88 6.08 .487 <.05 .065 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 1, 88 11.08 .202 .001 .112 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 
x Condition 
1, 88 2.73 .202 .102 .030 
Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 88 11.42 .232 .001 .115 
Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability x Condition 
1, 88 1.06 .232 .307 .012 
Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 88 10.32 .253 <.01 .105 
Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability x Condition 
1, 88 0.60 .253 .441 .007 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity 
1, 88 2.86 .252 .094 .031 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Condition 
1, 88 0.04 .252 .851 <.001 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 88 11.85 .274 .001 .119 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability x Condition 
1, 88 1.64 .274 .203 .018 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 88 4.45 .253 <.05 .048 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability x Condition 
1, 88 6.654 .253 <.05 .070 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 
x Conclusion Believability 
1, 88 0.26 .256 .610 .003 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 1, 88 0.00 .256 .963 <.001 
 
138 
x Conclusion Believability x Condition 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Conclusion Believability 
1, 88 0.14 .285 .708 .002 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Conclusion Believability x 
Condition 
1, 88 0.02 .285 .878 <.001 
 
b. Response Latency Results 
 
Variable(s) DF F MSE p η
2
 
Type 1, 88 6.99 2.521 x 10
8
 .010 .074 
Type x Condition 1, 88 0.23 2.521 x 10
8
 .634 .003 
Premise Believability 1, 88 39.64 6.146 x 10
7
 <.001 .311 
Premise Believability x Condition 1, 88 4.72 6.146 x 10
7
 <.05 .051 
Conclusion Validity 1, 88 0.12 4.910 x 10
7
 .733 .001 
Conclusion Validity x Condition 1, 88 0.94 4.910 x 10
7
 .335 .011 
Conclusion Believability 1, 88 22.36 8.099 x 10
7
 <.001 .203 
Conclusion Believability x Condition 1, 88 0.49 8.099 x 10
7
 .485 .006 
Type x Premise Believability 1, 88 1.98 6.133 x 10
7
 .163 .022 
Type x Premise Believability x Condition 1, 88 0.41 6.133 x 10
7
 .526 .005 
Type x Conclusion Validity 1, 88 0.19 3.722 x 10
7
 .668 .002 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Condition 1, 88 0.00 3.722 x 10
7
 .969 <.001 
Type x Conclusion Believability 1, 88 9.58 6.808 x 10
7
 <.01 .098 
Type x Conclusion Believability x Condition 1, 88 0.21 6.808 x 10
7
 .650 .002 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 1, 88 1.40 3.300 x 10
7
 .240 .016 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 
x Condition 
1, 88 0.13 3.300 x 10
7
 .718 .001 
Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 88 0.06 5.126 x 10
7
 .800 .001 
Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability x Condition 
1, 88 1.82 5.126 x 10
7
 .181 .020 
Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 88 17.17 5.442 x 10
7
 <.001 .163 
Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability x Condition 
1, 88 0.00 5.442 x 10
7
 .976 <.001 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity 
1, 88 0.31 5.764 x 10
7
 .578 .004 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Condition 
1, 88 0.04 5.764 x 10
7
 .834 .001 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 88 0.00 5.670 x 10
7




Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability x Condition 
1, 88 0.00 5.670 x 10
7
 .955 <.001 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 88 0.43 4.107 x 10
7
 .513 .005 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability x Condition 
1, 88 0.01 4.107 x 10
7
 .941 <.001 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 
x Conclusion Believability 
1, 88 0.16 4.857 x 10
7
 .692 .002 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 
x Conclusion Believability x Condition 
1, 88 0.79 4.857 x 10
7
 .375 .009 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Conclusion Believability 
1, 88 0.77 5.678 x 10
7
 .382 .009 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Conclusion Believability x 
Condition 
1, 88 1.86 5.678 x 10
7





E. Experiment 5 
 
a. Conclusion Endorsement Results 
 
Variable(s) DF F MSE p η
2
 
Type 1, 38 8.20 .432 <.01 .178 
Premise Believability 1, 38 2.78 .360 .104 .068 
Conclusion Validity 1, 38 7.74 1.715 <.01 .169 
Conclusion Believability 1, 38 48.76 .581 <.001 .562 
Type x Premise Believability 1, 38 8.20 .361 <.01 .178 
Type x Conclusion Validity 1, 38 0.72 .270 .402 .019 
Type x Conclusion Believability 1, 38 2.37 .358 .132 .059 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 1, 38 10.03 .295 <.01 .209 
Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 38 8.53 .316 <.01 .183 
Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 38 0.60 .452 .444 .016 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity 
1, 38 5.64 .348 <.05 .129 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 38 4.95 .272 <.05 .115 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 38 0.16 .247 .690 .004 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 
x Conclusion Believability 
1, 38 2.71 .213 .108 .067 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Conclusion Believability 
1, 38 3.37 .210 .074 .081 
 
b. General Looking Time Results 
 
Variable(s) DF F MSE p η
2
 
Type 1, 24 21.16 2.467 <.001 .469 
Premise Believability 1, 24 21.32 1.568 <.001 .470 
AOI 1, 24 68.90 11.967 <.001 .742 
Type x Premise Believability 1, 24 0.31 1.171 .581 .013 
Type x AOI 1, 24 26.86 1.285 <.001 .528 
Premise Believability x AOI 1, 24 11.51 1.281 <.01 .324 






c. Pre- vs. Post- Conclusion Looking Time Results 
 
Variable(s) DF F MSE p η
2
 
Type 1, 24 20.22 2.132 <.001 .454 
Premise Believability 1, 24 21.89 1.932 <.001 .498 
Order 1, 24 120.14 1.063 <.001 .846 
Type x Premise Believability 1, 24 0.34 1.571 .565 .014 
Premises x Order 1, 24 1.22 .880 .280 .053 
Type x Premise Believability x Order 1, 24 12.48 .714 <.01 .362 
 
d. Gaze Transition from Conclusion to Premises Results 
 
Variable(s) DF F MSE p η
2
 
Type 1, 24 41.99 .979 <.001 .618 
Premise Believability 1, 24 6.22 .361 <.05 .193 
Conclusion Validity 1, 24 5.13 .678 <.05 .165 
Conclusion Believability 1, 24 0.04 .689 .951 <.001 
Type x Premise Believability 1, 24 0.16 .582 .687 .006 
Type x Conclusion Validity 1, 24 0.19 .627 .664 .007 
Type x Conclusion Believability 1, 24 0.52 .593 .475 .020 
Premise Believability x Conclusion Validity 1, 24 0.01 .434 .930 <.001 
Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 24 2.10 .347 .159 .075 
Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 24 4.86 .743 <.05 .158 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity 
1, 24 3.56 .602 .070 .121 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 24 0.22 .936 .644 .008 
Type x Conclusion Validity x Conclusion 
Believability 
1, 24 0.27 .546 .606 .010 
Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Conclusion Believability 
1, 24 4.65 .553 <.05 .152 
Type x Premise Believability x Conclusion 
Validity x Conclusion Believability 
1, 24 0.68 .747 .415 .026 
 
 
